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Abstract 
Since the end of the Cold War, several stateless diasporas residing in Western 
countries have been involved in separatist conflicts in their homelands. The aim of 
this thesis is to explore whether these diasporas tend to utilize a universalistic creed 
of liberalism for particularistic purposes. To fulfill this purpose, I will test the 
applicability of Maria Koinova’s theory on how diasporas tend to frame 
particularistic goals in liberal discourses. Designed as a case study of a least likely 
case, this thesis examines the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden. Interviews with key 
diaspora elites are combined with an analysis of official statements and speeches. To 
determine how and to what extent the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden has used liberal 
discourses and procedures to pursue a separatist agenda, I employ three indicators of 
the liberal creed, i.e. references to democracy, human rights, and universalism. The 
empirical results indicate that Koinova’s theory correctly explains important aspects 
of the political engagement of the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden. Thus, these 
diaspora elites tend to frame their separatist goal in liberal discourses. I suggest that 
my results highlight the glocal character of diasporas as they are operating 
strategically in the intersection between global and local contexts. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, scholars and policymakers have come to pay increasing attention to 
the phenomenon of diaspora politics. The upsurge of interest for diasporas has 
naturally followed a growth in their numbers, activities, and influence throughout the 
present world. Benefitting from new developments in communication technologies, 
these communities have become recognized stakeholders in international relations 
and their effect on homeland developments has received more and more attention. 
One aspect of this phenomenon that has received increased scholarly attention is 
diaspora engagement in homeland conflicts. This focus has given rise to an academic 
debate on whether conflict generated diasporas ought to be seen as peace-makers or 
peace-wreckers (cf. Smith & Stares 2007). Some scholars have argued that diasporas 
residing in Western host countries are to be treated as moderate actors due to the fact 
that they tend to adopt liberal discourses and procedures (cf. Antwi-Boateng 2012). 
Other Scholars have focused more on how conflict generated diasporas have made 
deliberate use of these liberal procedures to gain support from the international 
community (cf Koinova 2010). These scholarly perspectives share a view of 
international politics as dominated by liberal discourses of democracy and human 
rights, and stress the allure of such liberal creed for diasporas acting on the 
international stage. 
However, in a post-9/11 world, Muslim diasporas engaged in separatist struggles 
in their homelands have been met with increased suspicion in the West. Being 
accused of affiliation with international Jihadist organizations and of supporting 
Islamic terrorism, these diasporas have been branded the anti-thesis of the so called 
“free world” they reside in. Given this suspicion of Muslim diasporas as champions 
of principles that stand in sharp contrast to liberal values; how do these diasporas 
relate to the liberal creed? How do they fit into the theories expecting diasporas in 
the West to adopt liberal values and procedures? 
This thesis will dig deeper into this puzzle by analyzing a fairly unknown Muslim 
diaspora with a separatist agenda, i.e. the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden. During most 
of the decades long civil war in Aceh, the leadership of the separatist movement 
lived in exile in the Stockholm suburb of Norsborg. From Sweden they directed the 
insurgents in Aceh until the war ended in a peace agreement in 2005. Whereas some 
of the most influential members of the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden have returned 
to Aceh, a significant number of Acehnese exiles chose to stay in Sweden and have 
continued the struggle for independence. Building on new primary material, this 
thesis will focus on this poorly researched diaspora and analyze how they have 
utilized the liberal creed in their separatist struggle for Acehnese independence. 
Thus, this thesis sets out to make both a more general theoretical contribution in 
increasing the cumulated understanding of how conflict generated diasporas adopt 
liberal discourses, and an empirical contribution in expanding the quite limited 
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scientific knowledge of  the political engagement of the Acehnese diaspora in 
Sweden. 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
The overall purpose of this study is to analyze whether conflict generated stateless 
diasporas, residing in Western host countries, tend to utilize the universal creed of 
liberalism for particularistic purposes.  
To fulfill this purpose, I will conduct an empirical test of Maria Koinova’s (2010) 
theory of how diasporas frame particularistic goals in liberal discourses. The 
empirical test will be designed as a case study of how – and to what extent – the 
Acehnese diaspora in Sweden has promoted a separatist agenda. The Acehnese 
diaspora has been accused of affiliation with Jihadist organizations and Islamic 
terrorism and could thus be considered a highly unlikely candidate of being attracted 
by discourses related to the liberal creed. If the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden indeed 
turns out to frame their separatist struggle in liberal discourses, it would therefore 
give strong support to the suggested importance of the liberal creed in international 
politics, and also indicate unique abilities of diasporas to connect local particularistic 
agendas to global universalistic discourses. 
Taken together, these conditions and purpose culminate in the following research 
question: 
 
 In what ways and to what extent has the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden used liberal 
discourses and procedures to advance a separatist agenda? 
 
To answer this question, I will conduct interviews with selected diaspora elites 
among the Acehnese living in Sweden. Their answers and outlooks will be combined 
with an analysis of records of their political statements, together with a review of the 
existing literature on the topic. 
1.2 Delimitations 
As indicated by the purpose and research question above, the focus of this study lies 
on the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden. While some references will inevitably be made 
to the Acehnese diaspora as a whole, the main analysis and conclusions will concern 
the Swedish based faction of the diaspora. Within this faction, the focus of this study 
is on those members of the diaspora that hold more prominent positions within this 
community and that are politically active in homeland affairs. 
As will be further elaborated bellow, liberal discourses and procedures are 
understood as those related to issues of democracy, human rights and universalism. 
Moreover, particularism is in this case translated to agendas of ethnic separatism. 
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To the extent that this thesis comes to any generalizable conclusions, the 
population of cases that is implicitly thought of is here defined as stateless conflict 
generated diasporas from homelands with contested sovereignty that reside in 
countries in the “Western world”. 
Finally, I have not set any absolute time frame for my analysis. However, since 
the separatist conflict in Aceh started in 1976, and since the first political refugees 
from Aceh started to arrive in Sweden in the following years, there is no need to 
stretch the frame to any earlier point in time. Furthermore, since the liberal creed 
arguably attained its dominant status in the international realm after the end of the 
Cold War, the thesis is naturally balanced more toward the period starting in the 
1990s. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
Following this introduction, the next chapter will establish the theoretical foundation 
of this thesis. The elusive diaspora concept will be discussed in some detail and a 
conceptual definition will be provided. The next section will be devoted to a 
discussion on previous research on diaspora politics and will situate my study within 
an existing field of research. The final section of this chapter stipulates and dissects 
the theory guiding this thesis and clarifies how it will be employed. Chapter three 
contains a discussion on methodological and material dimensions. It starts with an 
outline of the overarching design, and proceeds with a discussion on the material and 
how it has been collected. In chapter four the empirical results of the paper are 
presented and analyzed. Before embarking on a discussion on the extent to which the 
Acehnese diaspora has adopted values and procedures related to democracy, human 
rights, and universalism, I provide a background to the Acehnese conflict and 
diaspora. Having analyzed my empirical results and established that Koinova’s 
theory accurately explains a great deal of how the Acehnese diaspora has pursued 
their separatist agenda, chapter five identifies the theoretical implications of these 
findings. Finally, chapter six briefly summarizes the results and provides some 
concluding remarks, before suggesting potential avenues for future research related 
to the results of this thesis. 
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2. Theory 
This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section discusses the 
complex concept of diaspora. Drawing upon existing studies of diasporas, this 
discussion eventually results in the conceptual definition that will guide this thesis. 
The second section reviews previous research on diaspora politics. Focusing on 
diaspora engagement in homeland conflicts, this section attempts to situate this thesis 
in relation to existing research. The third and final section will provide a discussion 
on the underlying theoretical assumptions of the theory used in this thesis, and clarify 
how it will subsequently be weighed against the empirical findings of my case study 
in chapter four. 
2.1 The Elusive Concept of Diaspora 
The usage of the concept of diaspora has accelerated in recent studies on migration, 
transnational politics, and migrant communities. This veritable explosion in the 
usage of diaspora as a theoretical concept has led to a simultaneous expansion in its 
meaning and application. Until quite recently, the diaspora concept has been almost 
indistinguishable from the experience of Jewish exile communities. Starting in the 
1970s, a conceptual expansion has resulted in what Faist (2010: 12) terms “a 
veritable inflation of applications and interpretations” of the concept of diasporas. 
Accordingly, as the meaning of the concept has swelled, so has the number of 
different scholarly interpretations and applications. The academic definition of 
diasporas has come to incorporate a large number of different transnational 
formations, including groups based on a shared ethno-national identity; such as the 
Sri Lankan (Orjuela 2008) and Lebanese (Asal 2012) diasporas, religiously defined 
diasporas; such as the Muslim (Moghissi & Ghorashi 2010) and Orthodox (Hayes 
2010) diasporas, and vast “pan-diasporas” based on a wider geographic denominator, 
such as the Latino (Wortham et al. 2002) and African (Edozie 2012) diasporas. 
This expansion of the meaning of diasporas has led some scholars to warn against 
the risk of conceptual stretching and eventual conceptual uselessness. Faist (2010: 14) 
calls the diaspora concept an “all-purpose word”, and Amrith (2011: 57) notes that: 
“At its most imprecise, diaspora has become synonymous with migration; almost any 
migrant group is now labeled a diaspora.” Similarly, Brubaker (2005: 1) calls this 
proliferation of the concept “a ‘diaspora’ diaspora”, i.e. “a dispersion of the 
meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space”. 
Given this conceptual expansion, I recognize the importance of explicitly stating 
the definition that will guide this thesis. In line with Sheffer (2003: 9-10), I will 
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delimit my definition to only include what he calls “ethno-national diasporas”. This 
specification puts an emphasis on ethno-national identity and implies that diaspora 
members have to share a sense of belonging to an existing or imagined nation or 
“homeland”. They also have to share elements of a common ethno-national identity 
around which their diasporic community is mobilized (ibid: 11-12). Moreover, in 
accordance with Sheffer (ibid: 9-10) I recognize that diasporas have to uphold some 
sort of connections with people in their actual or perceived homeland, and with 
compatriots in other host countries. These are also the factors that separate diaspora 
members from “mere” migrants. 
However, in contrast to Sheffer, I see no reason to delimit the definition of 
diaspora to only include those who “permanently reside […] in host countries” (ibid: 
9, my emphasis added). Moreover, Sheffer’s definition seems to require that 
diasporas “are active in the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres.” (ibid: 
10, my emphasis added). According to my definition of the concept, it will suffice 
that the community is active in one of these spheres (along with the other criteria 
stipulated below) to be titled a diaspora. 
Adamson (2012: 31-32) sees diasporas as transnational identity networks 
mobilized around ethno-national identity constructions. Political entrepreneurs are 
viewed as essential in the process of mobilizing these ethnic communities as 
transnational social movements. By labeling diasporas as a form of transnational 
network, Adamson is able to draw on the more extensive literature on transnational 
social movements (cf. Smith 2008; Keck & Sikkink 1998). Since the transnational 
character of the diaspora is crucial for my study, this aspect will be added to my 
definition of the concept. Furthermore, Adamson’s emphasis on the importance of 
certain political entrepreneurs and elites as a focal point for diaspora politics, will 
also inform the focus of this study. 
Before turning to the definition guiding this thesis, a couple of additional 
classifications within the diaspora concept are expedient. Sheffer (2003: 73-74) 
divides his categorization of ethno-national diasporas into two sub-groups; stateless 
and state-linked diasporas. Whereas stateless diasporas pertain to diaspora groups 
whose perceived nation of origin does not correspond with an existing nation-state 
(e.g. the Kurdish, Palestinian, Tamil, and Acehnese diasporas), state-linked diasporas 
cover those groups whose perceived homelands actually coincide with nation-states 
(e.g. the Ukrainian, Liberian, Chinese, and Croatian diasporas). As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, the focus of this study will be on stateless conflict generated 
diasporas. The concept of conflict generated diasporas has been thoroughly discussed 
by Lyons (2006a: 111) and refers to diasporas that were forced to emigrate due to 
war in their homeland. Lyons (ibid.) states that such diasporas often tend to harbor 
stronger feelings of symbolic attachment toward their place of origin. 
The definition guiding this thesis will be heavily influenced by the definition 
carved out by Sheffer,
1
 with a few clarifying amendments. Based on the comments 
                                                 
1
 Sheffer’s (2003: 9-10) original definition reads as follows: ”[A]n ethno-national diaspora is a social-
political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard 
themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one or 
several host countries. Members of such entities maintain regular or occasional contacts with what 
they regard as their homelands and with individuals and groups of the same background residing in 
other host countries. Based on aggregate decisions to settle permanently in host countries, but to 
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made above, my definition will thus be a revised version and reads as follows:  
 
A diaspora is an ethno-nationally based social formation, created as a result of 
migration. Its members regard themselves as being of the same ethno-national origin 
and reside as minorities in one or several host countries. They are to be perceived as 
transnational identity networks mobilized by political entrepreneurs around ethno-
national identity constructions. Members of such entities maintain contacts with what 
they regard as their homelands and with individuals or groups of the same 
background residing in other host countries. Diasporas and their members are active 
in the cultural, social, economic, or political sphere. The diaspora also establishes 
external transnational networks that reflect complex relationships between the 
diaspora, their host country, their homeland, and often other international actors. 
2.2 Previous Research on Diaspora Politics 
Diaspora activities in homelands and host countries span a significant number of 
different fields. Scholars interested in diaspora activities have studied diaspora 
engagement in for example humanitarianism, development, economic investment, 
politics, cultural diffusion, knowledge transfer, and conflict (Brinkerhoff 2011: 117). 
Economic and social remittances in a development or investment context have been 
the focal point of much recent research on diaspora activities (cf. Gillespie et al. 
1999; Bodomo 2013; Davies 2012). A predominantly optimistic view on the 
potential of diasporas’ development engagement and economic investment in home 
countries characterize many of these studies and there is an ongoing debate about 
how to best fulfill this potential (cf. Brinkerhoff 2009). 
Studies of diasporas’ cultural engagement have for example focused both on the 
extent to which diaspora communities have maintained and nurtured homeland 
culture abroad (cf. Huang & Jiang 2010; Holmes 2007), and how diaspora members 
experience host country culture (cf. Stoessel et al. 2012). Research on diasporas’ 
political engagement include studies on diaspora communities’ active participation in 
homeland elections and political campaigns through voting, lobbying, financial 
donations, and technical expertise (cf. Lyons 2006b; Hammond 2012). It also 
contains research on diaspora lobbying vis-à-vis host country governments (cf. 
Rubenzer 2011; Heindl 2013), and toward international institutions like the EU (cf. 
Berkowitz & Mügge 2014). 
Related to these studies on lobbying and political engagement is the research on 
diaspora involvement in homeland conflict. According to Brinkerhoff (2011: 117), 
the knowledge of how diasporas engage in homeland conflicts is the weakest 
compared to research on other fields of diaspora activities. The main bulk of research 
                                                 
maintain a common identity, diasporans identify as such, showing solidarity with their group and their 
entire nation, and they organize and are active in the cultural, social, economic, and political spheres. 
Among their various activities, members of such diasporas establish trans-state networks that reflect 
complex relationships among the diasporas, their host countries, their homelands, and international 
actors.” 
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on this topic has focused either directly or indirectly on whether diasporas are to be 
deemed peace-makers or peace-wreckers (cf. Smith & Stares 2007; Swain 2007). 
One of the camps in this debate argues that diasporas ought to be seen as a factor that 
risks renewing or prolonging civil wars. This viewpoint was arguably first articulated 
by Collier and Hoeffler (2000) in their famous study on motivations for rebellion. 
Collier and Hoeffler (ibid: 11) state that diaspora members living in OECD countries 
are generally more affluent than their compatriots at home. Considering the fact that 
they do not directly suffer the consequences of renewed conflict, they are likely to 
make financial contributions that might prolong the civil war. Other scholars have 
instead focused on the peace promoting potential of diasporas and argued for their 
active involvement in mediation and peace building (cf. Baser & Swain 2008; Koser 
2007).  Yet another group of scholars has come to the conclusion that diasporas 
could be both agents of peacemaking and agents of conflict escalation, depending on 
what their engagement looks like (cf. Brinkerhoff 2011; Orjuela 2008). As Orjuela 
(2008: 436) puts it: “[Diaspora engagement in conflicts] can be a double-edged 
sword, as it can reproduce – or reduce – grievances and inequalities that fuel the 
conflict.” 
Scholars focusing on the negative impact of diasporas on peace processes (cf. 
Fair 2005; Hockenos 2003), tend to view diasporas as harboring conflictive attitudes 
stemming from traumatic experiences related to their forced migration (see also 
Anderson 1998; Kaldor 2001). Hall (2013: 26) contradicts this assumption and 
argues instead that diasporas from conflict ridden areas tend to hold more moderate 
stances than their compatriots at home. According to Hall (ibid: 26-27), this 
moderate attitude results from the fact that exiles naturally distance themselves from 
the harsh realities on the ground and become less inclined to defend group identities.  
Antwi-Boateng’s (2012) study of what he sees as a shift in the Liberian 
diaspora’s tactics from hard-power strategies to a soft-power approach is in line with 
the literature focusing on the moderate and appeasing aspect of diaspora engagement 
in conflicts. However, it puts more emphasis on the process of change in diaspora 
behavior. Having previously supported warring parties in Liberia with financial and 
material resources, the Liberian diaspora in the US has now started to rely more on 
dialogue, public diplomacy, and media assistance (ibid: 55-57). Antwi-Boateng (ibid: 
60-62) explains this shift to more moderate measures by referring to a positive view 
of the US and American values in Liberia – something that enables the diaspora to 
wield influence through soft-power strategies. While offering an intriguing 
explanation to diaspora adoption of liberal values, the consequence of this argument 
would be that only diasporas from homelands with a highly favorable view of this 
value system will eventually subscribe to it. 
Koinova (2010) tries to reach beyond the dichotomous debate on whether 
diasporas are to be seen as moderate peace promoters or radical war prolongers, and 
suggests that diasporas are “actors that engage strategically in homeland projects” 
(ibid: 164). More specifically, Koinova (ibid.) argues that diasporas linked to 
homelands with limited sovereignty tend to make instrumental use of democratic 
discourses and minimal democratic procedures to pursue particularistic nationalist 
goals. Differently stated, they “utilise the universal creed of liberalism for 
particularistic purposes” (ibid: 155). This argument is in line with Faist’s (2010: 16) 
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comment that “universal norms – such as collective self-determination, democracy 
and human rights – may enable local or national claims.” Thus, universal norms are 
mainly referred to in order to extract support from international actors and 
democratic procedures are used to boost nationalism (Koinova 2010: 161). Koinova 
is obviously providing a highly instrumentalist approach to diasporas’ usage of the 
liberal creed. Hence, diasporas utilize liberal discourses and procedures solely as a 
tool to promote other, higher valued, ends. 
Although compelling and in line with the purpose of this thesis, Koinova’s theory 
needs to be exposed to a more thorough test than she is able to provide with her own 
case study. Koinova (ibid: 153) tries to give her theory empirical support by looking 
at the cases of the Albanian, Armenian, Ukrainian, Serbian, Kosovan, Macedonian, 
and Lebanese diasporas in the US. Except of the Lebanese diaspora, Koinova’s cases 
are made up of diasporas that probably contain a significant number of people who 
have fled communist rule in eastern and southeastern Europe. I would argue that 
these diasporas are particularly likely to adopt liberal values since these values stand 
in sharp contrast to the political system they have resisted and escaped. Thus, 
Koinova appears to have selected cases that are likely to confirm her theory. I 
disagree with her claim that these cases are “representative of diasporas generated by 
conflicts and severe tensions in deeply divided societies” (ibid.).  I would argue that 
they are not representative of some less likely cases, i.e. diasporas affiliated with 
homeland organizations that have often been perceived as radically religious or as 
ethnic separatists (and potentially terrorists), and are seen as working against liberal 
values.
2
 
Despite these methodological objections against Koinova’s study, her theory 
nevertheless provides a compelling understanding of the issue of interest in this 
thesis, namely how and to what extent conflict generated and stateless diasporas tend 
to use liberal discourses in pursuing separatist agendas. In fact, Koinova’s theory is 
probably the most elaborate theoretical account on conflict generated diasporas and 
liberal discourses, and constitutes a suitable point of departure for this thesis. As 
became evident from my discussion on previous research above, this theoretical field 
is poorly explored in the scholarly literature. This thesis will set out to test the extent 
to which a conflict generated diaspora with a separatist agenda indeed adheres to the 
liberal creed. Accordingly, it will also constitute a more thorough test of the 
empirical applicability of Koinova’s theory. 
Finally, a few words should be mentioned about the existing literature on the 
Acehnese diaspora. Due to its small size and quite recent creation, the Acehnese 
diaspora is a poorly studied community within the academic field of diaspora politics. 
The only scholar who has paid considerable attention to this diaspora is Antje 
Missbach. Missbach’s studies have shed light on aspects quite different from the 
focus of this thesis – i.e. reasons for staying among members of conflict generated 
diasporas after the end of conflict (cf. Missbach 2010); the diaspora impact on 
conflict and post-conflict developments in Aceh (cf. Missbach 2011a); how the 2005 
peace agreement affected the Acehnese diaspora (cf. Missbach 2011b); and dynamics 
behind the diasporization and de-diasporization of the Acehnese diaspora (cf. 
                                                 
2
 For a more thorough discussion on the principle underlying my case selection, see section 3.1.1. 
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Missbach 2013). However, it will nevertheless constitute an important source of 
information for my empirical analysis. 
2.3 Operationalizing and Testing a Theory of the Liberal 
Creed 
The theoretical ambition of this thesis is to expose Koinova’s theory to a more 
rigorous test. However, it should be noted that this thesis does not seek to conduct a 
theoretical test in a strictly positivistic sense, but rather embraces a softer qualitative 
approach to theory testing. Instead of trying to prove the absolute accuracy of the 
theory, I intend to lend it significant empirical support by testing its applicability on a 
“least likely” case.3 My case, the Acehnese diaspora, could be seen as least likely of 
adopting liberal discourses. Thus, it will constitute a suitable test to the assumptions 
underlying Koinova’s argument.  
This section serves to dissect the theoretical foundation of Koinova’s argument to 
more explicitly uncover what will later be tested in my case study. I will argue that 
Koinova’s argument departs from a much more general debate on cultural 
globalization and dispersion of values. More specifically, it is based on the 
assumption that the process of globalization has resulted in a dominant world culture 
based on liberal values such as the virtue of democracy, human rights, and 
individualism. Below, I will try to capture the premises and roots of Koinova’s 
theory to be able to carve out indicators whose applicability can be tested in the 
ensuing case study. 
Several scholars have written extensively on how an increasingly significant 
process of globalization has influenced local and global value systems. This field of 
research overlaps with a broader debate on the dynamics of cultural globalization. 
One of the arguments in this debate stresses the converging effect of globalization on 
cultures and value systems, and is thus termed the cultural convergence perspective 
by Ritzer (2010: 244). The hypothesis underlying this perspective is that cultures 
tend to grow more alike. Some scholars belonging to this school of thought tend to 
denounce the imperialistic character of globalization and its tendency to 
“Americanize” the world (ibid: 100-101 & 259-260). Other scholars are more 
optimistic about what they regard as the eventual victory of “Western values”, an 
optimism that led Fukuyama (1992) to declare the “end of history”. Refraining from 
adding any normative connotations, Koinova (2010: 153) depicts a similar world 
order by stating that diasporas “filter international pressures for democratisation in a 
world where the liberal creed has no significant ideological opponent after the end of 
the Cold War”.  
Similarly, Meyer et al. (1997: 168) discuss the existence of a dominant “world 
culture”. The modern world culture originates in Western Christendom and provides 
a frame for social life that is constituted by “a demystified, lawful, universalistic 
                                                 
3
 I will return to a discussion on my approach to theory testing in section 3.1. 
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nature” (ibid.). The modern world culture has been further formed and re-created 
through the American international hegemony that emerged after the end of World 
War II, which explains the world-cultural preference for political democracy, market 
economy, and elements of American individualism (ibid: 167-168). In Koinova’s 
(2010: 155) words: 
 
[D]emocracy promotion has […] long been embedded in the foreign policies of major 
powers such as the US and the European Union, as well as global institutions linking 
democracy promotion with development aid, such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Thus, almost every country in the world – even if not 
sincerely interested in promoting democratisation within its borders – has been exposed 
directly or indirectly to elements of the liberal creed. 
 
Koinova (ibid: 157) relates this development to the US policy of global democracy. 
Diasporas have been seen as important disseminators of the principles and values 
underlying this policy. Similarly, Shain (1999: 8) has studied how diasporas have 
contributed to spread what he sees as the American values of democracy, human 
rights, free-market economics, and religious pluralism to their homelands. 
It should be noted that countries and individual or collective actors resist 
elements of this world culture. However, even these actors tend to pursue purposes 
and take actions that are in line with world-cultural expectations (Meyer et al. 1997: 
159 & 161). Meyer et al. (ibid: 161 & 174) claim that even some nationalist and 
religious groups that openly opposes this dominant world identity have adopted 
selected elements of world culture and expressed it in universalistic terms to boost 
their legitimacy. This is obviously an argument closely related to Koinova’s 
instrumentalist view on the lure and usefulness of liberal values. 
Nation-states that fail to adjust their features and practices to the expectations 
associated with being part of the world community will face persistent external 
suggestions to correct their behavior and to adhere to world-cultural principles. Thus, 
political activists like social movements can and will use world culture to pressure 
their governments to become more democratic and fulfill their human rights 
obligations in line with the expectations of the world society (ibid: 159-160). In the 
words of Meyer et al. (ibid: 160):  
 
If a particular regime rhetorically resists world models, local actors can rely on 
legitimacy myths (democracy, freedom, equality) and the ready support of activist 
external groups to oppose the regime. 
 
Social movements are particularly inclined to decry failures of implementation of 
such aspects of world culture. Thus, transnational social movements try to support 
nation-states’ implementation of world culture in local spaces (ibid: 164-165). Smith 
(2008: 10) suggests a growing tendency in this direction and claims that the 
transnational identities often reflected in the campaigns of social movements have 
increasingly assumed a universal character. According to this view, such movements 
are now more likely to emphasize a shared humanity, rather than particularistic 
differences. 
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Drawing on Adamson’s view of diasporas as constituting a type of social 
movements, this study will try to determine whether the liberal elements outlined 
above are applicable on the Acehnese diaspora as well. The extent of their 
applicability will decide whether Koinova’s theory stands the test. 
To capture how diasporas adopt liberal values, Koinova (2010: 156) draws upon 
theories on the practice of framing. Frame analysis is common in communication 
studies but has also been used within the field of international relations. Theories of 
framing are applied to show how a cause can be framed within a rather different 
discourse (cf. Chong & Druckman 2007; Pokalova 2010). Scholarly works drawing 
on these theories study how acts of linguistic framing might influence the public 
opinion on different phenomena. Likewise, in their analysis of transnational 
advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 2-3) study how these actors “’frame’ 
issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and 
encourage action, and to ‘fit’ with favorable institutional venues.” Koinova (2010: 
157) specifically analyzes how the issue of sovereignty has been shrouded and 
rephrased in discourses of democracy and human rights. In other words, diaspora 
leaders are seen as political entrepreneurs that frame their nationalist cause in 
democratic discourses. The task of this thesis will be to investigate whether these 
discourses are present in the political involvement of the Acehnese diaspora. 
Based on the discussion above on the theoretical foundation underlying 
Koinova’s argument of a liberal creed, I will try to determine the role and importance 
of these discourses and procedures in the political engagement of the Acehnese 
diaspora. Key indicators of the liberal creed, as discussed above, are thus identified 
to be democracy, human rights, and universalism. The democracy indicator can 
pertain to both references to the necessity of instituting democratic values and 
procedures in Aceh, as well as references to the importance of making use of 
democratic procedures (e.g. referendums, inclusive debates and processes, and 
democratic channels) in the work of the Acehnese diaspora and Acehnese 
independence movement. The human rights indicator is perhaps more straight 
forward and applies to explicit statements involving the concept of human rights. 
These references to human rights issues are closely related to appeals and pleading to 
human universalism. Since these two indicators are hard to entirely separate, they 
will be presented together in the analysis section of this paper. Indications of 
universalism include references to the universal applicability of international law and 
the obligation of the international community to act on behalf of a shared humanity. 
The importance ascribed to these three elements will also have to be assessed in 
relation to the promotion of particularistic agendas of separatism. 
I am aware that this operationalization of liberal discourses and procedures into 
three indicators is not mutually exclusive, but the purpose of this categorization is 
rather to create a simple methodological tool that facilitates the empirical analysis of 
my material. In section 3.2.1, these indicators are translated into codes and categories 
for the upcoming analysis of my empirical data. 
If discourses and procedures related to democracy, human rights, and 
universalism are deemed to play an insignificant role in the political engagement of 
the Acehnese diaspora, Koinova’s theory will be slightly weakened. Conversely, if 
the Acehnese diaspora – despite its perceived anti-Western character – is indeed 
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proven to have adopted liberal values and procedures, it will undeniably provide 
strong empirical support for Koinova’s theory. 
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3. Method 
As was highlighted in the discussion in the previous chapter, the diaspora 
phenomenon is a highly complex one. The increasing complexity in the dynamics of 
diaspora politics is a reflection of what Flick (2009: 12) sees as a “pluralization of 
life worlds”. According to Flick (ibid.), the increasing popularity in applying 
qualitative research strategies is related to this understanding of a growing 
complexity in social interactions and expressions. Thus, when studying highly 
complex social issues, such as diaspora politics, globalization, and value systems, 
this thesis will try to generate in-depth knowledge by applying a qualitative research 
strategy. 
As stated in section 2.3, this thesis seeks to make a theoretical contribution in the 
field of diaspora politics by testing a theory of diasporas’ inclination to adopt liberal 
principles and practices for particularistic reasons. To fulfill this purpose, my study 
will be designed as a qualitative case study. I will begin this chapter by discussing 
this design, including the logic behind the case selection. In the second part of this 
chapter, I will move on to a discussion on the material and the techniques used to 
retrieve it. The data collection will consist of semi-structured interviews and a 
complementing analysis of existing literature and text materials. 
3.1 The Case Study Design 
The case study design has a history of being lauded by social scientists for its wide 
applicability and its strengths in building and testing complex theories (cf. George & 
Bennett 2005; Yin 2009; Eckstein 2000). In-depth analyses of one or a few cases 
enable scholars to dig deep into multifaceted social phenomena, while still allowing 
them to use their findings to develop robust theories. It works as a bridge between 
traditional deductive research and detailed qualitative findings (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner 2007: 25). Having stated the ambition to test the applicability and accuracy 
of a more general theory, while at the same time acknowledging the difficulty of 
capturing the complexity of the diaspora phenomenon in quantitative large-N studies, 
this bridging feature of the case study design fits neatly with my purpose. 
Eckstein (2000: 119 & 127-128) highlights the centrality of theory testing in case 
studies and sees it as an integrated stage of an overarching process of theory building. 
In testing the applicability of Koinova’s theory on a crucial case of conflict generated 
stateless diasporas, this thesis recognizes the theory testing procedure as an 
integrated part of a broader process of theory building. Thus, after having applied the 
theory identified in chapter 2 on my case, I will return to a theoretical discussion to 
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stipulate the theoretical implications of the case study, something that could enable 
further testing and development in forthcoming academic works. The case study 
design will enable such a shift from working mainly deductively to a more inductive 
approach. Accordingly, working cumulatively, this thesis should be seen as an 
attempt to make both a theoretical contribution to the academic field of diaspora 
politics, and an empirical contribution in its effort to better understand the activities 
of a poorly studied diaspora. 
The empirical goal to generate a more detailed understanding of the value and 
procedure adoption of the Acehnese diaspora requires a more intensive approach. 
The single-case study format enables such an intensive analysis and allows for a 
complex understanding and nuanced account of the phenomenon under study 
(Landman 2008: 28-29). However, since this thesis also seeks to draw more 
generally applicable theoretical conclusions, the logic behind the case selection 
procedure becomes of uttermost importance. To avoid ending up with a mere 
empirical description of a highly unique and deviant case, the case selection will be 
based on the principle of the existence of “least-likely” cases, and in close 
connection to the applied theory. This ambition of making inferences that have 
implications beyond the original case makes the design comparative (ibid: 28). 
By basing my case selection on the logic of least-likely cases, I draw upon 
Eckstein’s (2000: 143-149) review of the utility of selecting crucial cases. According 
to George and Bennett (2005: 9) a crucial case is “one in which a theory that passes 
empirical testing is strongly supported and one that fails is strongly impugned”. It is 
thus important to stress that a crucial case might support or weaken a theory, not 
prove or falsify it altogether (cf. de Vaus 2001: 222). As Eckstein (2000: 149) points 
out, a least-likely case selection is usually tailored to confirm the theory in question. 
This holds also for this thesis, which regards Koinova’s theory as compelling but 
insufficiently applied and weighted against empirical observations. If the theory turns 
out to accurately explain the politics of the Acehnese diaspora, it would indeed lend 
it strong support. 
Eckstein (ibid: 149-151) argues that there are both methodological and practical 
reasons for selecting crucial cases rather than a larger number of objects of study. In 
addition to the already mentioned merits of being able to increase the level of detail 
and nuance, selecting crucial cases is less costly when it comes to money, time, and 
manpower. This is especially the case when the analyzed units constitute complex 
collective individuals as in the case of studying diaspora politics. Eckstein (ibid: 149) 
highlights Michels’ (1959) analysis of the inevitability of oligarchy in organizations 
as the best-known example of a political study using the least likely case selection 
strategy. To provide support for his thesis of the “iron law of oligarchy”, Michels 
tested his theory on organizations that were conceived of as promoting grassroots 
democracy (mainly Germany’s Social Democratic Party) and came to the conclusion 
that even these organizations tended to adopt oligarchic structures. 
The implicitly comparative character of this thesis inevitably involves a modest 
ambition to make some generalizations beyond the Acehnese diaspora. The extent to 
which such an ambition is achieved will determine the external validity of the study 
(cf. de Vaus 2001: 28-29). Even though comparison as a tool of isolation emanates 
from a neopositivist research tradition, this thesis is also influenced by elements of a 
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critical realist outlook (cf. Jackson 2011). The aim here is not primarily to isolate 
causal mechanisms, but rather to elucidate and determine the applicability of certain 
social patterns. The goal is to make modest approximations of an objective reality, 
something that in this case necessitates an awareness of the impossibility of claiming 
to have uncovered universal and definitive explanations. The goal is rather to 
determine whether the pattern identified by Koinova applies also to a least likely case, 
something which would extend the reach of the theory’s generalizability, and thus, 
what it might help us understand. 
3.1.1 The Acehnese Diaspora as a Least Likely Case 
So what makes the Acehnese diaspora a least likely case? It has pursued a separatist 
agenda based at least partially on ethnic motives. It has contained politically 
prominent members with leading roles in the conflict in Aceh, making Indonesia 
direct political pressure against their host countries to take actions against these 
individuals (cf. Schulze 2006: 261-262). Perhaps more importantly, the Acehnese 
separatist struggle has repeatedly been characterized – mainly by Indonesia, but also 
by other actors – as essentially Islamic, anti-West, or even radically Islamist. 
Braziel (2008: 200-213) notes that diasporas with political agendas – especially 
those from Muslim countries – have faced increasing levels of suspicion in the West 
after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Similarly, focusing on how the 9/11 
attacks affected perceptions of Muslim immigrants in the West, Monshipouri (2010: 
45) maintains that: 
 
The 9/11 attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the 2005 London transit attacks have 
further inflamed the view of Islam as the “enemy,” an image informed by centuries of 
Orientalist thinking. The persistence of this perception at the public level has made it 
virtually impossible to extricate Western Muslims from the external political enemy. 
 
Analysts like Gunaratna (2002: 6-7) have argued that Muslim diasporas in the West 
have been particularly vulnerable to al-Qaeda infiltration due to feelings of political 
impotence. Regardless of the extent to which specific Muslim diaspora communities 
have actually been religiously radicalized, the level of suspicion, distrust, 
polarization, and alienation is likely to have grown in the aftermath of 9/11. 
The Acehnese insurgents (and by extension also the diaspora) have faced various 
allegations after the 9/11 attacks. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has been 
accused of having links with the Afghan mujahedeen and al-Qaeda (Tan 2004: 29). 
Reports have asserted that al-Qaeda have trained up to 3,000 followers in recruitment 
centers and training camps in Aceh (ibid.). Journalists have given the Aceh 
separatists labels like “Muslim militants” (Maclean’s 2003: 10), think tank analysts 
have called for listing GAM as a terrorist organization due to alleged connections to 
“worldwide terrorist underground” (Dillon 2004: 3-5), and scholars have warned of 
the risk of a turn toward more radical Islam among GAM followers (Tan 2008: 205). 
Several of the diaspora members interviewed for this study confirmed the existence 
of such suspicions and described how the Indonesian government has tried to brand 
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them as “fanatics”, “fundamentalists”, and “opponents of the Western culture” 
(Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). 
Given these allegation of being supporters of Islamic terrorism, violent 
separatism, and religious fundamentalism, the Acehnese diaspora will be treated as a 
least likely case. Thus, it refers to the unlikelihood that a diaspora facing such a 
reputation would subscribe to the liberal ideas and norms that have underpinned the 
Bush Doctrine and the concept of “the global war on terrorism” – the very policies 
that have thrown public suspicion on these groups in the wake of 9/11.
4
 In a time of 
polarization and labeling of Muslim communities as anti-Western and as the antipode 
of the so called “free world”, disenchantment on the part of Muslim diasporas in the 
West seems like a more likely reaction. The Acehnese diaspora has indeed pursued a 
highly particularistic and separatist agenda and their international reputation has been 
influenced by the suspicions of affiliation with Islamic terrorist organizations. I 
suggest that, taken together, these circumstances render their adoption of liberal 
values very unlikely.  
Finally, it is important to make sure that the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden could 
be considered to match the criteria defining the set of cases which Koinova’s theory 
is designed to cover. Koinova (2010: 151) states that her study “concentrate[s] 
specifically on diasporas in liberal democracies linked to homelands experiencing 
limited sovereignty.” Furthermore, her imagined population of cases shares the 
feature of being conflict generated (ibid: 153). The Acehnese diaspora in Sweden 
matches these criteria perfectly and could consequently be considered to belong to 
the population from which both Koinova and I select our cases. 
3.2 Material and Data Collection 
Having described the overarching design of this thesis, I now turn to the more 
concrete aspect of collecting empirical data for my case study. The discussion bellow 
revolves around the motives and implications of the chosen techniques for data 
collection and the treatment of the material. The main data collecting technique used 
in this thesis is semi-structured interviews with key members of the Acehnese 
diaspora in Sweden. As a complement to the conducted interviews, I have also drawn 
upon other primary sources in the form of different text materials, and a review of 
the existing literature on the topic. 
3.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
According  to Yin (2009: 106), the interview as a research method is an essential 
source of case study information. It allows the researcher to focus directly on the 
case study topic and could give a direct insight into the minds and reflections of the 
                                                 
4
 For a more thorough discussion on the importance of liberal-democratic values as an integral part of 
the Bush Doctrine and the war on terrorism, see Fiala (2007).   
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individuals that have personally experienced relevant aspects of it. When the purpose 
is to gain a better understanding of people’s experience, motives, and reasoning, the 
interview normally takes the form of a guided conversation, rather than structured 
queries (ibid: 102 & 106-109). Several scholars have called this interview format 
semi-structured interviews (cf. May 2011: 134-136; Leech 2002). 
The semi-structured interview has been acknowledged for enabling respondents 
to “generate and deploy meaning in social life.” (May 2011: 135). This makes it a 
suitable technique in generating understanding of how diaspora elites think about 
values and how this spills over into their political engagement in their homeland. 
Compared to a more standardized format, the semi-structured interview allows 
respondents to answer more on their own terms, while still ensuring some degree of 
consistency and comparability (ibid.). Certain comparability is necessary in order to 
evaluate the significance of some of the answers received in the interviews. However, 
comparability between the interviewees is not the primary target since I am more 
interested in accumulating an aggregated understanding of the perspectives of 
influential diaspora members on the topic under study. 
In preparing the interviews, I constructed a framework of questions based on the 
purpose my research project. This interview guide constituted the precept and a 
conceptual itinerary in all the conducted interviews.
5
 The open-ended format does 
not only provide the respondents with more freedom to put their answers in their own 
words, it also opens up some space for improvisation on the part of the interviewer. It 
allows the researcher to deal with unexpected answers by asking follow-up questions. 
This was of particular value in my study since I did not have much case-specific 
previous research and knowledge to lean on. Consequently, my pre-understanding of 
the phenomenon I was studying was patchy and several concepts and issues that 
surfaced during the interviews had to be further clarified and elaborated. This 
element of improvisation allowed me divert from the interview guide when deemed 
necessary. However, the guide provided a guarantee that the conversation stuck to 
the original focus and was consistent with the theoretical purpose of my thesis. 
In accordance with Leech’s (2002: 667-668) recommendation, I tried to include 
several different types of questions to get the most out of my interviews. I used a 
combination of what Leech calls “grand tour questions” and “example questions” in 
asking the interviewees to mention examples of diaspora activities and political 
advocacy work and to walk me through these specific occasions. In line with the 
discussion on follow-up questions above, I also included several “prompts”. 6 
Prompts are questions meant to extract more information from a given answer and 
they could both be planned (e.g. the follow-up questions to question 14 in my 
interview guide, where I for example ask the interviewees to specify which 
politicians or organizations they have approached, how they have done it, and which 
response they have received) and more improvised or informal (ibid.). Furthermore, I 
asked all the interviewees if they agreed to answering follow-up questions later if 
additional queries should arise when the interview was being analyzed. All 
respondents agreed to this and on a couple of occasions I asked for clarifications by 
email. 
                                                 
5
 The interview guide is attached in the Appendix of this thesis. 
6
 May (2011: 142) refers to this practice as “probing”. 
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Much of the literature on the practice of interviewing brings up ethical issues in 
conducting an interview for research purposes. This includes the right to informed 
consent, the right to anonymity, and the necessity of establishing rapport and trust 
between the interviewer and the participants (cf. Warren 2001: 88-90; Scheyvens et 
al. 2003: 139-147). These considerations are arguably of even greater importance in 
a study like this, that touches upon issues that might be regarded as sensitive and risk 
inflicting inconvenience on part of the respondents. Since the participants in this 
study have engaged politically in a separatist struggle in their homeland, and since 
they have friends and relatives remaining in Aceh, the topic of this thesis is 
characterized by an inescapable sense of sensitivity. Therefore, I have taken 
precaution in all the stages of my contact with the participants. I was careful to make 
sure that the topic and implications of my research were made clear at the start of the 
interview. I have offered all my participants an option to remain anonymous, and I 
have spelled out the respondents’ right to abstain from answering my questions. Thus, 
procedures to ensure that trust and rapport were established were essential to this 
thesis. Trust was considered fundamental in making respondents talk about delicate 
matters, and, maybe even more importantly, to consider recommending friends and 
associates to participate in my study. It indirectly became a tool to gain increased 
access. 
Another measure taken to ensure a certain level of comfort was to play down the 
seriousness of the interview by starting off the conversation with everyday chitchat 
and to avoid using an overly academic language. Due to the centrality of the diaspora 
concept to my study, I initially provided the interviewee with a more colloquial 
definition of the term.  
An issue related to establishing rapport is whether to use a tape recorder in the 
interview situation, and much has been written on its pros and cons (cf. Silverman 
2010: 199-201; Warren 2001: 91-92). I used a tape recorder for all my interviews, 
mainly due to the convenience of having the conversation on tape. It would have 
been extremely difficult to remember and accurately reproducing the entire 
conversations without recording them, especially since all the interviews lasted for 
more than one hour and fifteen minutes. However, I always asked in advance for the 
consent of the participants to use a tape recorder during the interview. 
To analyze the result of my interviews, I used a simple tool for analysis based on 
codes and categories. I sorted the answers deemed relevant to the empirical analysis 
into four themes – or codes; the three indicators of liberal discourses and procedures 
(democracy, human rights, and universalism) and an additional code for 
particularistic discourses of separatism. Naturally, the four codes were also divided 
into two categories; one related to liberalism and one related to separatism. Such 
scheme of codes and categories is based on Saldaña’s (2013: 9) recommendations, 
and serves as a guarantee of some degree of systematization in the search for patterns 
in the data. I paid special attention to answers that included both categories, since 
these answers could indicate an instance of framing. If possible, I also tried to 
determine whether the references to liberal discourses were clearly instrumental 
(which would be in accordance with Koinova’s theory), or showed signs of more 
genuine commitment. Moreover, the democracy code was divided into two sub-
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groups based on whether the answer referred to democratic values and principles or 
democratic procedures. 
It should be noted that all the interviews were conducted in Swedish. Therefore, 
the direct quotations from these interviews are all translations from the original 
transcripts. 
Based on the emphasis on the importance of political entrepreneurs in theories of 
framing – and on my pre-understanding of diaspora elites as the community 
members who usually initiate the adoption of new policies, values, and practices – 
my focus has been on identifying and including politically influential members of the 
Acehnese diaspora. Thus, my interviews should be viewed as a form of elite 
interviews (cf. Richards 1996). The interviewees are selected as a result of being – or 
having been – in a position of influence and insights into the agendas and political 
engagement in the diaspora. As such, this type of elite interviewing is close to what 
Flick (2009: 165-166) calls the “expert interview”. The interviewees are expected to 
have superior knowledge of diaspora activities stemming from their own prominent 
position within the diaspora. Yin (2009: 107) notes that the more the participants are 
used as such a source of information, the more their role becomes that of an 
“informant” rather than a “respondent”. Having stated this, distinguishing between 
respondents and informants becomes less important. The interviewees were asked 
questions both as insiders and part of the phenomenon under study, and as experts of 
the field in which they are or were situated. This has implications for the 
representativeness of my sample. As Björnehed (2012: 68) notes: 
 
[W]hen it comes to elite interviews, […] a low number of respondents do not have to 
equal an unrepresentative sample. In elite interviews, sampling is based on selecting key 
individuals in certain positions who are of importance precisely for their particular 
insights with regard to the decision making process. 
 
As in Björnehed’s (ibid.) study of ideas in conflict, random sampling would not be of 
any particular use here, since it is the experience of key individuals that are the focus 
of this study. The total number of interviews conducted for this thesis was seven, in 
which all but one respondent
7
 are linked to the renascent version of ASNLF
8
 and still 
actively pursue a separatist agenda toward Aceh. Thus, the relatively small number 
of participants becomes of less importance due to their designated roles in the study. 
The participants are not meant to be a representative sample of the entire diaspora 
residing in Sweden. As will be discussed in more detail in section 4.2, the Acehnese 
diaspora in Sweden is probably (and has always been) the politically most active 
faction of the diaspora. Moreover, even though complex collective actors like 
                                                 
7
 The exception is Bakhtiar Abdullah who was spokesman for the GAM leadership in Stockholm 
during the Aceh conflict. Abdullah still calls himself a member of GAM and holds a long-term vision 
of an independent Aceh, but has ceased most of his political engagement and does not support the 
political struggle of the current ASNLF faction in Sweden (Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah 2014). 
His prominent position within GAM during the conflict years makes him an important informant of 
the strategies of the Acehnese diaspora during that time. 
8
 Originally, ASNLF – standing for Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front – is the more formal 
name for GAM. Presently, the acronym is mainly used by a mostly Swedish based faction of the 
diaspora that opposes the 2005 MoU. 
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diasporas are by definition somewhat heterogeneous, a significant majority of the 
Swedish based members that are still politically active advance a separatist agenda 
that is non-consistent with, and more far-reaching than, the 2005 peace agreement 
(Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014; Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014; Interview with 
Bakhtiar Abdullah 2014). Focusing on a diaspora faction that is arguably more 
radical and holds the most unwavering posture toward Acehnese independence is in 
line with the least likely design employed in this thesis. 
In this context it should also be noted that all the participants are men. This is 
likely to reveal something interesting about the gender composition among political 
elites more generally, but this discussion is nonetheless outside the scope of my 
study.
9
 
The technique used in this thesis to select the respondents was based on snowball 
sampling. This technique refers to the practice of letting the respondents suggest 
other suitable participants for the study. It is particularly useful when it is difficult to 
locate relevant respondents due to a sensitive research topic (Biernacki & Waldorf 
1981: 141-142). As already indicated above, politically active diaspora elites in 
separatist conflicts are likely to be particularly hard to locate.  
The snowball sample is associated with a high risk of bias in the opinions and 
voices presented (May 2011: 145). As has been discussed in this section, and as is 
further discussed in section 4.2, the current Acehnese diaspora in Sweden seems to 
hold a quite uniform position in their political engagement toward their homeland. 
This obviously reduces the risk of omitting important political positions in the 
diaspora, and I have further tried to minimize this risk by turning to more than one 
“gatekeeper” to gain access to diaspora members. However, it is possible that the 
politically less active part of the Swedish based diaspora holds divergent opinions 
toward their homeland. Even though the focus of this thesis is on diaspora elites, 
such potential disagreements should be noted and kept in mind by the reader. 
3.2.2 Complementing Text Material 
My empirical analysis will also draw upon some additional primary sources. Press 
releases, statements, and transcriptions of speeches by members of the Acehnese 
diaspora in Sweden will constitute an important complement to my interviews. Most 
of these texts are available online on ASNLF’s website10 or on websites archiving 
documents and statements related to the Aceh conflict.
11
 However, a couple of the 
texts have been given directly to me by members of the diaspora. All these texts will 
be treated in the same way as my interviews, and discourses related to separatism, 
democracy, human rights, and universalism will therefore be searched for. 
As described in section 2.2, my analysis will also be complemented by a review 
of the existing literature on the Acehnese diaspora. Such secondary data will be of 
                                                 
9
 For a discussion on gender roles in the Aceh conflict see Aquino Siapno (2002). 
10
 <http://www.asnlf.org/>. 
11
 E.g. <http://acehnet.tripod.com/> and <http://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/southeastasia/aceh/ 
aceh.htm>. 
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particular value when compiling a historical perspective on Acehnese diaspora 
engagement.  
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4. Empirical Analysis 
This chapter contains the empirical results and analysis of this thesis. It is divided 
into three sections of which the first gives a short background to the armed conflict in 
Aceh. The second section describes the composition and political engagement of the 
Acehnese diaspora, focusing mainly on the faction based in Sweden. The third 
section provides an analysis of how – and to what extent – the Acehnese diaspora in 
Sweden has adopted liberal discourses and procedures to pursue a separatist agenda. 
The final section is divided into three sub-sections based largely on the coding 
categories explained in section 3.2.1. 
4.1 Background to the Aceh Conflict 
Aceh has been a site of recurring conflict and violence ever since it was incorporated 
into Indonesia after independence from the Netherlands in 1945. Although the trigger 
of conflict has varied over time, the territorial status of the area has remained a 
constant source of contention (Åkebo 2013: 90-91). Open conflict first erupted in 
1953 when Acehnese insurgents led the Darul Islam-rebellion against the Indonesian 
government. The motive for the uprising was to be found in an increasing fear of 
losing religious, political, and economic autonomy to an Indonesian state that had 
become centered on Javanese identity (Bertrand 2004: 166-167; Rist 2010: 111). The 
uprising ended in a peace agreement in 1959, giving Aceh some minor benefits 
(Means 2009: 259-260). However, resentment among the Acehnese population 
remained strong due to economic marginalization, political centralization around 
Jakarta, and authoritarian rule – especially during the presidency of Suharto 
(Ziegenhain 2010: 120-124). 
These feelings of resentment eventually translated into renewed conflict in 1976. 
This was the year when Hasan di Tiro founded the Free Aceh Movement, also known 
as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), and declared Aceh independent from Indonesia 
(Means 2009: 260). For almost three decades, GAM waged a low-intensive war 
against the Indonesian government, which it saw as an imperialist successor to the 
Dutch colonial rule. To achieve its goal of Acehnese independence, GAM engaged in 
protracted guerilla warfare, performing hit-and-run ambushes against Indonesian 
targets (Schulze 2006: 225-228). In response, the Indonesian government used its 
army, paramilitary forces, and police squads to launch periodical counter-insurgency 
operations in Aceh (ibid: 244-249). During the first year of fighting, the Indonesian 
security forces killed several guerillas and forced the leadership of GAM, including 
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Hasan di Tiro, into exile. From Stockholm, Sweden, di Tiro and his closest associates 
continued to direct the Acehnese rebellion (Means 2009: 261). 
After having been curtailed by Indonesian security forces, GAM regained 
strength toward the end of the 1980s. After insurgents had intensified their attacks 
against Indonesian police, army units, civilian authorities, suspected government 
informers, and non-Acehnese settlers, the Indonesian government decided to declare 
Aceh a “military operation area” known as Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) 
(Ziegenhain 2010: 123). DOM lasted until 1998, when Suharto stepped down from 
power, and entailed significant human suffering. GAM fighters as well as civilians 
suspected to be supporters of the insurgency faced arbitrary arrests, torture, and 
targeted killings during the military operations conducted by Indonesian forces. 
Severe human rights abuses fueled the conflict and generated local support for the 
cause of the insurgency (Means 2009: 261-262).  
Even though the conflict continued after Suharto’s resignation and Indonesia’s 
initiation of democratic reforms, these events nevertheless opened up new space for 
peace negotiations between the two parties. A number of new laws came into effect 
in 2001, granting Aceh special autonomy. This implied a process of decentralization 
in which Aceh gained increased political, economic, cultural, and religious autonomy 
(Schulze 2007: 89-90). The first preliminary peace talks with the GAM leadership 
were initiated in 2000. Although the negotiations were interrupted by renewed 
guerilla violence and new government directed military operations, talks between the 
parties continued (Means 2009: 265-267).  
In 2004 a massive earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused enormous human 
suffering and material devastation in Aceh. Soon after the tsunami had struck Aceh, 
both GAM and the Indonesian government announced unconditional cease-fires. 
Although it did not take long until both sides had violated the truce, the tsunami 
brought a new political environment to Aceh. The international community initiated 
a massive relief effort and along with it followed international pressure to solve the 
conflict. Representatives for Indonesia and the GAM leadership met in Helsinki in 
2005 under the guidance of former Finish president Martti Ahtisaari and his NGO 
Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), and finally managed to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) (ibid: 270-274). This comprehensive peace agreement spelled 
out Aceh’s right to exercise authority within all public sectors, its right to elect a 
governor and a legislature, and its entitlement to a large share of revenues from the 
extraction of natural resources in the area. It also included provisions on 
disarmament of GAM fighters, the withdrawal of all Indonesian “non-organic” 
military and police forces, and an amnesty for those individuals imprisoned for 
alleged connections to the Free Aceh Movement. In addition, a human rights court 
and a commission for truth and reconciliation were to be established to investigate 
war crimes (Kingsbury 2006: 199-205). In a 2013 report, Amnesty International 
(2013) criticized the Indonesian authorities’ lack of progress on investigating such 
crimes. However, despite sporadic outbursts of violence – especially in the context of 
local elections – Aceh has enjoyed relative peace since 2005 (ibid: 20). 
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4.2 The Acehnese Diaspora 
The Acehnese diaspora is a relatively young, conflict-generated, stateless diaspora. 
Acehnese people of certain professions have had a tradition of residing and working 
abroad well before the armed separatist rebellion erupted. However, a more cohesive 
Acehnese identity did not develop until scores of Acehnese refugees started to arrive 
in Malaysia in the 1980s due to the separatist conflict (Missbach 2013: 1063). 
Accordingly, Missbach (ibid.) argues that it was not until the Acehnese refugees 
united in their common suffering over the conflict in their homeland, that an 
Acehnese diaspora evolved. Most of the Acehnese migrants sought refuge in 
Malaysia and the number of Acehnese living in Malaysia totaled more than 80,000 at 
the peak of conflict (ibid: 1068). The main wave of refugees from Aceh arrived in 
Malaysia in the 1990s due to political prosecution during the DOM era (Interview 
with Yusuf Daud 2014). However, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) was allowed to arrange resettlement of some of the refugees to 
“Western” countries like Sweden, Denmark, Norway, USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand (Missbach 2011b: 184; Interview with ASNLF member 1 2014). In 
2006, approximately 700 Acehnese were living in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, 
300 in the US, 100 in Canada, and 250 in Australia (Missbach 2013: 1064-1065). 
Many of the leading figures within the GAM movement were among the refugees 
that sought political asylum and resettlement in Western countries. Malaysia was 
considered to be too dangerous for the leadership and its most prominent members, 
including Hasan di Tiro, Zaini Abdullah, Malik Mahmud, Bakhtiar Abdullah, 
Husaini Hasan, and Daud Husin, were granted political asylum and citizenships in 
Sweden in the early ‘80s (Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014; Missbach 2013: 1066). 
Husaini Hasan was the first of the GAM leaders to arrive in Sweden. He applied for 
asylum in Sweden since he knew about two West Papuans whom had been allowed 
to stay in the country for similar reasons. Soon the other leading GAM figures, their 
families, and other political refugees from Aceh followed suit (Interview with Yusuf 
Daud 2014). During the DOM operations in the 1990s a “second generation” of 
Acehnese political refugees arrived in Sweden, and members of the diaspora now 
talk about a “third diaspora generation”, consisting of Sweden born sons and 
daughters of the first and second generations (Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). 
In the beginning, the Acehnese exile community in Sweden was small but well 
organized. They set up connections with GAM fighters on the ground and developed 
connections with diaspora groups from West Papua and the South Moluccas 
(Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). An Acehnese National Council was set up in 
Malaysia and worked as a link between the leadership in Stockholm and the guerillas 
in Aceh (Missbach 2011b: 185). Sweden quickly became the center for GAM outside 
of Aceh, and although diaspora organizations started to pop up in Denmark, Norway 
and the US, the leadership and its followers in Stockholm constituted by far the best 
organized part of the Acehnese diaspora (Missbach 2013: 1065; Missbach 2011b: 
185-186). 
The activities and methods of the GAM leaders and the overall Acehnese 
diaspora have changed over time (Missbach 2013: 1079). Initially, the diaspora 
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focused on financial and material sponsoring of the conflict (ibid: 1067). Acehnese 
throughout Southeast Asia assisted in the smuggling of weapons into Aceh, and the 
leadership directed insurgent activities over satellite phones from Sweden (Schulze 
2006: 252). The diaspora was a base for guerilla recruitment and some diaspora 
members were even sent to Libya to receive military training and ideological 
indoctrination (Missbach 2013: 1066-1067). In the 1990s, the diaspora turned more 
to international lobbying, diplomacy, and propaganda distribution. It was a deliberate 
act to internationalize the conflict and to raise international awareness of the situation 
in Aceh (Schulze 2006: 236-237; Means 2009: 267), something which I will return to 
in more detail in the forthcoming analysis. 
GAM was mainly represented by Malik Mahmud (GAM’s Prime Minister), Zaini 
Abdullah (GAM’s Foreign Minister), and Bakhtiar Abdullah (spokesman of the 
exiled leadership) during the peace negotiations in Helsinki in 2005 (Kingsbury 2010: 
137). Hasan di Tiro was still the symbolic leader of the organization at that time, but 
his actual function was significantly reduced after he suffered a stroke in 1997 
(Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). After the MoU was signed, some of the most 
prominent diaspora elites returned to Aceh permanently, or on a partial basis. Malik 
Mahmud and Zaini Abdullah took up political roles in the new local party Partai 
Aceh (PA), while other returning diaspora elites occupied positions as personal 
advisors to the local government (Interview with ASNLF member 4 2014; Missbach 
2011b: 189-190). Bakhtiar Abdullah returned temporarily to Aceh to provide training 
to local political actors on behalf of the Olof Palme International Center (Interview 
with Bakhtiar Abdullah 2014). All in all, approximately half of the Acehnese 
diaspora decided to return to Aceh. The lion share was Acehnese living in Malaysia, 
while only a few dozen of the diaspora members residing in the West returned 
(Missbach 2011b: 187). 
Missbach (ibid: 193-198) has noted quite contradictory trends in the behavior of 
those in the Acehnese diaspora who decided to stay in exile after the 2005 MoU. In 
the aftermath of the peace agreement a palpable sentiment of exhaustion 
characterized the mood in the diaspora (ibid: 193). This observation was confirmed 
in an interview with an ASNLF member who described a widespread feeling of 
disillusionment stemming from a disappointment over not having been granted 
independence (Interview with ASNLF member 3 2014). According to this Acehnese 
man: “People felt that between 50,000 and 60,000 Acehnese died in vain […] we got 
that autonomy already back in 1945 and what is happening now is just that we get 
the autonomy once again” (ibid.). This disillusionment led some diaspora members 
to withdraw from the diaspora altogether by resigning all types of activities and 
contacts with their co-ethnics (Missbach 2011b: 193). This trend was in line with a 
tendency of de-politicization among some diasporans. Diaspora members following 
such a trend avoided discussing politics after the MoU and instead focused on socio-
cultural community activities (ibid: 194). 
However, there were also contradicting trends of increasing engagement in 
homeland affairs among some diasporans. These individuals participate intensively 
in online discussions on topics related to the social and political developments in 
Aceh and appeal to international bodies to raise the international awareness of the 
situation in their homeland. Yusuf Daud recounted numerous visits to the UN 
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headquarters in Geneva in an interview, and described his participation at Universal 
Periodic Review (UPR) sessions, at Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization 
(UNPO) meetings, and at various side events (Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). 
Missbach (2011b: 196-197) suggests that such persistent engagement constitutes an 
attempt to justify remaining in exile after the end of conflict. Such justification 
should be viewed in the light of what Missbach (ibid.) identifies as an increasing gap 
between the diaspora and the political decision making in Aceh.  
Finally, Missbach (ibid: 197-198) notes a tendency of opposition against the 
MoU and continued struggle for independence among some diaspora groups. The 
most renowned of these groups is the mostly Sweden based renascent version of 
ASNLF. This version of ASNLF is an extension of what was previously known as 
KPAMD (Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). KPAMD was founded in 2006 and 
worked for an Aceh independent from Indonesia through public relations and by 
raising awareness and distributing propaganda (Missbach 2010: 124-125). One 
member of this faction referred to the MoU as “the second tsunami” (Interview with 
Yusuf Daud 2014). As noted in section 3.2.1, this is also the faction of the diaspora 
that has been in focus in this thesis. 
The Sweden based part of the diaspora lost most of its local influence and 
political clout when the most prominent members of the GAM leadership returned to 
Aceh. Nevertheless, it is still probably the most politically active branch of the 
diaspora and it enjoys at least some local support in Aceh (ibid.). According to their 
own admission, the Swedish branch is still seen as the center of diasporic political 
activity among fellow diaspora members around the world (Interview with ASNLF 
member 3 2014). An ASNLF-member living in Stockholm estimated the Acehnese 
diaspora in Sweden to currently number somewhere between 150 and 200 
individuals, including youngsters born in Sweden to Acehnese parents (Interview 
with ASNLF member 4 2014). They have started the overarching association 
Svensk-Atjehnisiska Föreningen (the Swedish-Acehnese Association, SAF) (also 
known as Meunasah Atjèh, Swedia) with its base in Norsborg, Stockholm. Another 
related community association was on the way to start up in Örebro in 2014 under 
the name Örebro Achehniska Förening (Örebro Acehnese Association, ÖAF) 
(Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). Similar community organizations have also been 
founded in Denmark (Acehnisk Samfund Forening, or Acehnese Community 
Association, ASF), Norway (Aceh Sumatra Flykting Foreningen, or Aceh-Sumatra 
Refugee Organisation, ASFF), Canada (the Acehnese Canadian Community Society, 
ACCS), and in the US (the Aceh Centre). These organizations have been set up to 
facilitate integration in host countries, to maintain connections with Aceh, and to 
provide a link to other diaspora groups (Missbach 2010: 122). 
 27 
 
4.3 Liberal Values and Procedures in the Acehnese 
Diaspora 
In the following section, the extent to which the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden makes 
use of liberal discourses and procedures will be analyzed by employing the three 
indicators carved out in section 2.3. This analysis will be divided into three sub-
sections. The first of these sections discusses how the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden 
has employed a strategy of internationalization that both surrounds and phrases 
lingering particularistic goals. The purpose of this part is to provide an overarching 
backdrop which the following two sections can be compared against and 
incorporated into. The second and third section set out to analyze the presence of 
references to the three indicators in the rhetoric of the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden. 
Section 4.3.2 deals with references to democratic principles and procedures, whereas 
section 4.3.3 embarks on an analysis of references to the two closely related liberal 
components of human rights and universalism. 
4.3.1 Internationalization and Remaining Particularistic Goals 
Ever since the GAM leadership was forced into exile in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, internationalization has been a linchpin of the strategies of GAM and the 
Acehnese diaspora (Schulze 2006: 236-237). The strategy of internationalization of 
the conflict and situation in Aceh has implied an effort among members of the 
Acehnese diaspora to gain international recognition and support for their struggle for 
an independent homeland. It has been seen as the only way to level the playing field 
with Indonesia and has included efforts to reach out to countries, intergovernmental 
organizations, and NGOs (ibid: 236-238). The necessity of the strategy was further 
accentuated by the relative weakness of the movement’s fighters within Aceh 
(Missbach 2013: 1080). 
In this search for international allies, Hasan di Tiro and the other Sweden based 
GAM leaders repeatedly shifted their outlook and principles (Missbach 2011a: 92). 
As the conflict dragged on, the GAM leaders gradually changed their rhetoric 
depending on the imagined audience of their campaigns (ibid: 93; Aspinall 2007: 
253). In the words of Missbach (2011a: 93-94), di Tiro was “very flexible to global 
political trends”, adapting first to an anti-colonialist discourse in the late 1970s, then 
shifting toward a rhetoric inspired by Islamic anti-Westernism in the 1980s, and 
finally turning to a discourse of democracy and human rights in the 1990s. The final 
shift toward a discourse of human rights could be understood as first and foremost a 
reaction to international developments. According to Aspinall (2007: 254), the key 
turning points were the successful national secessions in Eastern Europe in the early 
1990s and East Timor’s independence from Indonesia in 1999. GAM now turned to 
the UN and major Western powers to gain their long awaited international support 
(Aspinall 2002: 10). East Timor was used as a “blue print” for GAM and inspired 
their activities. Accordingly, when discussing the importance of the international 
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community for the Acehnese struggle for independence, Bakhtiar Abdullah kept 
referring to the East Timorese case: “Why was East Timor granted independence? 
Because they gained support from the international community, even from the 
former colonial power” (Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah 2014). 
The initial response from the international community remained lukewarm, but as 
the focus on human rights intensified and permeated more and more of GAM’s 
rhetoric, the international community started to pay some attention to the human 
rights abuses in Aceh (Missbach 2011a: 95; Missbach 2013: 1074-1075). Looking 
back at this phase of the internationalization policy, Bakhtiar Abdullah describes it as 
a highly successful strategy in stating that: “Indonesia lost in the international arena, 
because we managed to convey the Acehnese struggle for freedom and at the same 
time internationalize Aceh” (Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah 2014). 
In the 2002 Stavanger Declaration, GAM openly declared a new focus in their 
foreign policy, stressing that: 
 
Achehnese abroad shall increase diplomatic efforts in order to improve international 
relations of the State of Acheh especially in the following countries: the Scandinavian 
nations, the European Union nations, the North American nations, Australia and the 
Pacific nations (The Executive Committee of the Worldwide Achehnese 
Representatives Meeting 2002). 
 
Together with this emphasis on the role of the Acehnese diaspora in the strategy of 
internationalization, the Stavanger Declaration also stated the importance of an 
increased cooperation with “friendly and neutral NGOs world wide” (ibid.).  
The strategy of internationalization remains important for the faction of the 
diaspora that still seeks independence from Indonesia. Members of ASNLF in 
Sweden confirmed using their website and social media to reach an international 
audience in an attempt to put pressure on Indonesia (Interview with ASNLF member 
4 2014; Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). After confirming the important role of the 
diaspora as a source of information for the international community, Yusuf Daud 
explained that: “Indonesia is not afraid of the movement inside Aceh. Or the one in 
West Papua or the South Moluccas. They are afraid of those abroad” (Interview with 
Yusuf Daud 2014). The crucial role of this strategy of internationalization to the 
Acehnese independence struggle could be highlighted by Aspinall’s (2002: 15) 
suggestion that the Acehnese nationalists’ interaction with the international system 
even has shaped their national identity. 
Interestingly enough, a member of ASNLF in Sweden confirmed the 
international dimension of their struggle, but when later asked about whether GAM 
had received any support from international Muslim organizations, he denied it on 
the basis of the Acehnese conflict being “a local issue” (Interview with ASNLF 
member 4 2014). Such an ambiguous stance toward the character of the conflict 
might both stem from GAM’s reluctance of being perceived as an Islamist 
organization in the eyes of the international community (in itself a sign of GAM’s 
current focus on a Western audience in their external communication) (cf. Missbach 
2011a: 98), and diasporas’ unique ability to frame issues in both global and local – 
universalistic and particularistic – discourses, depending on the purpose and audience. 
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Despite a substantial effort to muster international support through universalistic 
appeals, the Acehnese diaspora has in parallel developed and kept a highly 
particularistic agenda centered on Acehnese ethno-nationalist defined independence. 
According to Missbach (2011a: 92), the underlying nationalist ideology was crafted 
by di Tiro and his Acehnese associates in the diaspora. By referring to historical and 
cultural factors, di Tiro opposed the legitimacy of Indonesian rule in Aceh: 
“‘Indonesia’ is merely a new label, in a totally foreign nomenclature which has 
nothing to do with our own history, language, culture, or interests” (di Tiro 1984: 16). 
This line of reasoning has frequently reappeared in the rhetoric used by Acehnese 
diaspora elites. Sweden based former GAM minister Dr. Husaini Hasan expressed a 
similar view of the necessity of Acehnese independence at a conference on Aceh in 
Washington, D.C:  
 
[T]he only alternative that is appropriate for us – Achehnese – is to be free from 
Indonesia – that is a fixed price. We the Acehnese are not Indonesians. We have no 
historic, political, cultural, economic or geographic relationship with them (Hasan 1999). 
 
Although their rhetoric shifted to a human rights discourse, references to Indonesia 
as an illegitimate “colonial empire” has continued to characterize the language of 
Acehnese diaspora elites (cf. di Tiro 1995).  Echoing such a stance, Yusuf Daud 
described Indonesia as “real colonialists”, and declared that ASNLF’s goal was to 
“regain our country, which was lost during the ‘40s when Indonesia was created” 
(Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). 
Having outlined how such separatist and particularistic elements have coexisted 
with a strategy of internationalization in the Swedish based diaspora, I now turn to 
the significance of democratic values and procedures in the rhetoric and tactics of the 
diaspora. 
4.3.2 Democratic Discourses and Procedures 
An inclusion of democratic discourses and procedures has been a notable result of 
the Acehnese internationalization strategy from the 1990s and onward. Hence, the 
Stavanger Declaration proclaimed that: “[T]he state of Acheh practices the system of 
democracy” (The Executive Committee of the Worldwide Achehnese 
Representatives Meeting 2002). As part of the rhetoric surrounding their declared 
commitment to a democratic Aceh, the Acehnese diaspora has made recurrent 
references to the undemocratic nature of Indonesia. While admitting that promotion 
of democracy became an increasingly important element in their struggle, Bakhtiar 
Abdullah maintained that it was not entirely new: 
 
It had always been an important point in our struggle. Because as far as democracy is 
concerned, it had never existed in Indonesia. It was ruled by a military dictatorship the 
entire time. That is why we put up a fight. People tried to change this by supporting 
GAM and by being part of the struggle to establish a democracy (Interview with 
Bakhtiar Abdullah 2014).  
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By framing their struggle for independence as a way to escape and transform past 
and present Indonesian authoritarianism, the democracy discourse becomes a 
powerful tool in the separatist toolkit. In the quote above, Abdullah seems to hold a 
genuine and more deeply rooted dedication for democratic values, quite contrary to 
Koinova’s highly instrumentalist approach to diasporic value adoption. However, 
when asked why democracy gradually became a more important element in their 
struggle, Abdullah answered that: “We were in a peace process that will be 
monitored by the international community, including how we behave. That is why it 
was important to maintain this issue” (ibid.). Thus, an element of appeasement 
directed toward the international community seems to have guided their democracy 
promotion as well. 
Democracy has remained an important principle in the independence struggle of 
the current version of ASNLF in Sweden (Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). While 
being Secretary General for the now defunct organization Association of Achehnese 
Community in Scandinavia (PERMAS), Asnawi Ali composed a press release 
condemning the process leading up to the 2005 MoU as undemocratic:  
 
We, Achehnese Community in Scandinavia (PERMAS), wholeheartedly support the 
peace efforts and we wish a success. But we will never condone, under any 
circumstances, these undemocratic conducts to deliberately ignore the mainstream 
Achehnese civil society groups to fully participate in the process (Ali 2005). 
 
Meanwhile, Bakhtiar Abdullah expressed pride over the process for the exact 
opposite reason: 
 
I remember a democratic process. Together with the Palme Center – and this is 
something that I am proud of – we invited almost 300 people from different groups; 
ulama,
12
 activists, intellectuals, politicians – even Acehnese parliamentarians in Jakarta 
– female activists, students, and some representatives from the Acehnese diaspora to 
join us in Kuala Lumpur. […] This was a couple of days before we signed the 
agreement. […] We discussed its content in general and our goal to sign it and asked 
“what do you think?” And everyone agreed! […] So I think we were more democratic 
than if we would just had rejected peace (Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah 2014). 
 
Regardless of who is right about the degree of inclusiveness in the peace process, 
democracy has obviously also been used as a tool for legitimization in the internal 
disputes within the Acehnese diaspora. The faction still fighting for Acehnese 
independence repeatedly returns to the democratic necessity of holding a referendum 
to determine whether Aceh should remain under Indonesian rule or become an 
independent country. In the words of Yusuf Daud: 
 
We are still fighting for a referendum in Aceh. If Indonesia wants a real democracy in 
Aceh they should allow us to hold a referendum. And then we should see if the 
                                                 
12
 Ulama refers to Muslim religious scholars and teachers (cf. Basri 2010). 
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Acehnese want to be part of Indonesia or stay out of Indonesia. It is a question of 
democracy. […] Yes, independence is the last stop, the ultimate goal. But we should 
constantly review the human rights and democracy (Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). 
 
Similarly, another ASNLF member also referred to the desirability of holding a 
referendum when discussing democracy in an Acehnese context: “The solution is to 
let the Acehnese decide for themselves. To hold a referendum” (Interview with 
ASNLF member 2). This is also the stance proclaimed by ASNLF in international 
forums, which could be exemplified by this statement at a UNPO conference: 
 
Given the tragic fact that the once independent Acehnese have been subjected to 
centuries of oppression by Dutch, Japanese and Indonesian colonialists, it is not difficult 
to understand why the Acehnese firmly believe that independence is the only way 
forward and a free referendum is one of democratic ways to resolve the conflict (Daud 
2014). 
 
Thus, diaspora elites use the call for a referendum as a way to frame their goal of an 
independent Aceh in a discourse of democracy. The referendum becomes the link 
tying together the separatist and the democratic discourses. According to Schulze 
(2006: 237), references to a referendum started to appear in GAM’s political rhetoric 
when East Timor was granted independence and GAM imagined a similar scenario 
for Aceh. 
The referendum is also one of the democratic procedures highlighted in 
Koinova’s (2010: 160-161) case studies to show how such procedures have been 
used to boost nationalism and promote particularistic agendas. Other procedures 
include more vague diplomatic methods of non-violence. In the case of the Acehnese 
diaspora, Asnawi Ali discussed such methods and motivated them by stating that: 
“Thousands have already died during the conflict, so we try a different tactic of non-
violence” (Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). Likewise, Yusuf Daud recounted that: 
“When we arrived abroad, we thought that it must be possible to achieve our goal in 
a peaceful and diplomatic way” (Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014), suggesting that 
their tactics changed in exile. Some ASNLF members discussed the new possibilities 
that the democratic system in Sweden presented to their struggle. Asnawi Ali 
mentioned what he sees as the “moral responsibility” of diaspora members to use the 
possibilities provided by democratic systems: 
 
We in Sweden want them [the Acehnese in other countries] to become more active 
because they have freedom of speech. In Sweden we have freedom of speech which 
means that we can do whatever we want as long as it does not hurt anyone else. Hence, 
we can struggle [from abroad] (Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). 
 
In a similar vein, Bakhtiar Abdullah stressed the freedom of political maneuvering in 
Sweden as the greatest benefit of moving their struggle to the international arena 
(Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah 2014). Ali also described how the first generation 
of members of the Acehnese diaspora taught the second and third generation about 
democratic principles and procedures. This was knowledge that they “had not 
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learned in school” and that they obtained through practical training when the first 
diaspora generation sent them on political missions to Geneva, Brussels, and The 
Hague (Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). 
ASNLF of today uses the democratic space in Sweden to discuss topics related to 
Acehnese independence on online blogs, Facebook, and Twitter, to reach out to 
international NGOs, and to hold May Day demonstrations for an independent Aceh 
(ibid; Interview with ASNLF member 4 2014). This constitutes a good example of 
how democratic procedures could both be promoted and utilized by diasporas 
pursuing separatist agendas. 
To summarize, the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden has framed their struggle for 
independence as a struggle for democracy against an authoritarian Indonesian state. 
Moreover, diaspora elites regularly make references to a referendum on Acehnese 
independence as the only democratically sustainable solution. The importance 
assigned to democratic procedures is also evident in the internal diasporic 
disagreement over the process that led to the 2005 MoU. Finally, it is worth noticing 
how the diaspora has made use of democratic channels in Sweden in order to 
promote separatist goals, and how they stress the importance of such procedures. 
4.3.3 Human Rights and Universalism 
As noted above, the rhetoric of the Acehnese diaspora became increasingly 
characterized by “an even broader discourse of democracy and human rights” in the 
later part of the 1990s (Missbach 2011a: 95). Acehnese nationalists in general started 
to base their arguments for an independent Aceh on the brutality of Indonesian rule. 
This brutality also featured as a repeated proof of the invalidity of Indonesian 
colonial rule in GAM’s rhetoric at the time. (Aspinall 2002: 18 & 20). Aspinall (ibid: 
18) suggests that the sudden attractiveness of the human rights discourse stemmed 
from the growing power of international humanitarian intervention, and is thus 
closely related to the emerging dominance of the liberal discourse described in 
section 2.3. An ASNLF member in Sweden recalled how they approached major 
transnational human rights NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch in the 1990s (Interview with ASNLF member 3 2014). Diaspora members 
also started to make more frequent visits to Geneva to present their case at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights and the UNPO (ibid; Interview with Bakhtiar 
Abdullah 2014). Bakhtiar Abdullah specifically stressed the importance of Amnesty 
reports like “Indonesia: ‘Shock Therapy’: Restoring Order in Aceh 1989-1993” (cf. 
Amnesty International 1993), in making the international community listen to their 
appeals (Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah 2014). 
The Sweden based faction of the diaspora that still seeks independence for Aceh 
has continued to allude to human rights abuses. They regard themselves as a link 
between the local population and the international community: 
 
We work with [local] activists and NGOs. You know, the civil society. They can 
provide us with accurate information about the situation in Aceh. Then we write it down 
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in English and distribute it to Amnesty International or other organizations for human 
rights in Europe (Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). 
 
The Acehnese diaspora has frequently framed sovereignty issues in human rights 
discourses. Already Hasan di Tiro tried to connect human rights to GAM’s struggle 
for independence: 
 
The vary [sic!] concept of “Indonesia” is based, and predicated, on the denials of the 
Right of Self-Determination to the majority of the non-Javanese peoples of the Malay 
Archipelago. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right of Self-
Determination “The effective exercise of a peoples Right to Self-Determination is an 
essential condition for the genuine existence of other human rights and freedom.” But in 
today's discussions about human rights in “indonesia” the right to self-determination has 
been totally ignored, thereby justifying javanese colonialism even more! (di Tiro 1995). 
 
Clearly, di Tiro tries to frame Acehnese independence in a human rights discourse by 
using the concept of “right to self-determination”. Similar acts of framing have 
frequented the rhetoric of the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden. For example, Husaini 
Hasan reached out to the international community by saying: 
 
I sincerely appeal to all international human rights organizations, especially Amnesty 
International, Asia Watch, and all sympathizers of the oppressed peoples, and also the 
US Government to put pressure on Indonesia, not only on human rights issues but also 
concerning the rights of self-determination of the Achehnese people (Hasan 1999). 
 
Likewise, Asnawi Ali pointed out that: “To be granted your own country and self-
determination is part of the human rights” (Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). Such 
framing was also evident in the testimony submitted by ASNLF to the UPR in 
Geneva in 2012: 
 
As conventional wisdom has it, that there will be no peace without justice and there will 
be no justice without the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. And the 
human rights can not be fully, accountably realized if the right of a people to self-
determination is denied (ASNLF 2012a). 
  
It featured once again in a press release distributed at the same event: “Unless the 
right to self-determination to the people of Acheh and other fundamental freedoms 
are recognized, violations of human rights will continue unabated.” (ASNLF 2012b). 
These statements share an appeal to universally applicable laws and principles. 
By referring to universalism, the Acehnese diaspora tries to call attention to the 
binding obligations of the international community to interfere and pave the way for 
Acehnese independence. Consequently the rhetoric of the diaspora also features 
direct references to international laws and regulations: 
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Indonesia is the only colonial territories of the Dutch East Indies which has been 
perpetuated and never been decolonized properly in accordance with the procedures of 
international laws and the laws of decolonization (ASNLF 2012c). 
 
As has been mentioned in previous sections of this thesis, such references to the 
universality of international law are often closely connected to discourses of human 
rights. Consequently, when members of the diaspora frame separatist goals in a 
human rights discourse, this often coincides with references to discourses of 
universalism in terms of the responsibility on part of the international community to 
act in accordance with international law. A good example of this linkage is provided 
by a passage of Yusuf Daud’s speech to UNPO in 2014: 
 
Despotic and colonial regimes of 21
st
 century, such as Indonesia, often deem human 
rights and the rights to self-determination as antithesis of the territorial integrity of a 
state. It is undeniable that the territorial integrity of a state is recognized by international 
law, but human rights, including the right to self determination, are also an integral part 
of international law and by definition must be the legitimate concern of the international 
community (Daud 2014). 
 
Asnawi Ali made a similar connection when recounting how the diaspora has 
highlighted human rights issues by asking whether “the international community will 
let more people die?” (Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). A universalistic element 
also becomes apparent in more explicit references to a shared humanity. For example, 
di Tiro appealed to President Clinton to “[intervene] in the name of humanity to stop 
these atrocities upon our Acehnese people” (cited in Missbach 2011a: 95). More 
often though, such a shared humanity is referred to in a more subtle and implicit way, 
mainly by highlighting other cases perceived as experiencing the same problems as 
Aceh and where the international community is seen to have taken more adequate 
measures. This can be exemplified by Yusuf Daud’s comment on ASNLF’s efforts to 
trigger sanctions against Indonesian war criminals: 
 
We wanted all generals who were responsible for the killing in Aceh during the DOM 
era to be sent to the Hague Tribunal. In the same way as they did in former Yugoslavia, 
or in Rwanda, or in other parts of Africa. Why just not in Aceh? They have killed 
thousands of innocent people. Why let them walk free? (Interview with Yusuf Daud 
2014). 
 
If we follow Koinova’s instrumentalist approach, these references to human rights 
and a universal humanity ought to be seen merely as means to achieve a higher end, 
i.e. Acehnese independence. It is indeed possible to trace instrumentalist 
connotations in the way the Acehnese diaspora refers to human rights and 
universalism. Daud admits that it was very difficult to continue talking about 
independence in the immediate aftermath of the 2005 MoU: 
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It was really difficult in the beginning. After this Helsinki-agreement, we did not dare to 
talk about independence any longer. Instead we tried to utilize these human rights that 
have not materialized in Aceh (ibid.). 
 
When particularistic discourses of Acehnese independence was no longer a feasible 
argument in encounters with representatives of the international community, the 
human rights discourse seems to have constituted a passable complement. Asnawi 
Ali paints a similar picture: 
 
After the MoU we could not talk about independence. Then we came up with a 
spontaneous idea of what we could talk about – human rights. “This is your right to talk 
about. You who are victims of military operations have the right to talk about this”. This 
was one of the things we could talk about (Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). 
 
Ali admitted that the rhetoric of human rights is a deliberate tactic: “We try to hide in 
these human rights. We talk about human rights, but the goal is independence” (ibid.). 
He also claimed that the small size of the politically active Acehnese diaspora has 
made this rhetoric even more important: “If you have a strong organization like East 
Timor, then you can say that you want your own country. But if you are small, you 
should talk about human rights” (ibid.). Missbach (2011a: 97) describes how 
international human rights organization like Tapol urged GAM to include more focus 
on human rights in their statements in the 1990s – something that confirms the 
instrumental aspect and tactical usefulness of this discourse for the Acehnese 
independence struggle. 
However, it is also possible to discern a more genuine approach to the human 
rights aspiration among the Acehnese diaspora elites. Daud insisted that 
independence and human rights are equally important goals in their struggle and 
argued that: “They are inseparable. You can say that they are part of our struggle. 
They are very important” (Interview with Yusuf Daud 2014). Bakhtiar Abdullah took 
a somewhat different approach to the importance of human rights in the Acehnese 
independence struggle and argued that the Acehnese people already adhered to the 
principles of the human rights, but lacked the vocabulary to express it in the same 
way as is standard in the international community (Interview with Bakhtiar Abdullah 
2014). In the words of Abdullah:  
 
Previously, not everyone was aware of the human rights. They had not comprehended it. 
But, of course, we are Muslims and also Islam has rules on human rights. […] It was 
just a matter of learning the international standard agreed upon under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. But when we fought [in Aceh], we did not have enough 
time to learn about this issue. […] You have to respect the international law. Why do we 
have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? Well, as far as I am concerned, it 
does not contravene Islam. You are responsible for your actions, for what you do. If you 
commit crimes against humanity, it is not anything you can forgive. It is the same thing 
in Islam and under Islamic law (ibid.). 
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Furthermore, Abdullah also described how the Swedish based GAM leadership 
directed training of local commanders in human rights and on the contents of the UN 
charter (ibid.). According to Asnawi Ali, these principles of human rights are also 
taught to newcomers in the diaspora in Sweden by the first generation of diaspora 
elites (Interview with Asnawi Ali 2014). 
To sum up, human rights and universalism clearly play a crucial role in the 
internationalization strategy of the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden. Frequent 
references to the necessity to penalize the Indonesian government for abuses of the 
human rights and for crimes against humanity characterize the rhetoric of the 
diaspora. Moreover, the right to self-determination is used as a link between the 
human rights discourse and the quest for independence and enables the Acehnese 
diaspora to frame their separatist goals in a human rights discourse. References to a 
universally applicable international law also constitute an important ingredient in this 
rhetoric and points to the appeal of universalism in the internationalized struggle for 
Acehnese independence. In the following chapter, some theoretical implications of 
these empirical results will be suggested – opening up for future investigations of 
related aspects of diaspora politics. 
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5. Theoretical Implications 
The previous chapter provided an empirical analysis of how and to what extent the 
Acehnese diaspora in Sweden has utilized liberal discourses and procedures to 
promote a separatist goal. This chapter will constitute an attempt to draw theoretical 
conclusions from the empirical analysis. By evaluating the capability of Koinova’s 
theory to capture the political engagement of the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden, I 
will try to specify the theoretical implications and contribution of this thesis to the 
wider scientific field of diaspora politics. The first section will summarize the 
congruence between my empirical findings and Koinova’s theory, and link it to a 
more general theoretical discussion on diaspora politics. The second section will then 
identify some aspects that are perhaps more difficult to understand with Koinova’s 
theory, and provide some suggested theoretical implications of this discrepancy. 
5.1 Diasporas as Glocal Actors 
As has become evident from the analysis in chapter 4, Koinova’s theory correctly 
explains the actions and strategies employed by the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden on 
several points. A separatist agenda has been framed in liberal discourses of 
democracy, human rights, and universalism in the diaspora engagement in Aceh. The 
Acehnese struggle for independence has been depicted as democracy promotion in 
the face of Indonesian authoritarianism, and democracy promotion has been seen as 
an integrated part of the struggle. Discourses of democracy have constituted a tool 
and code of conduct to generate international support for Acehnese independence. 
Moreover, Koinova’s suggestion that Western based diasporas from homelands 
characterized by contested sovereignty, tend to utilize and refer to democratic 
procedures, seems to apply to the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden as well. Frequent 
references to the democratic necessity of letting the Acehnese people decide their 
fate in a referendum is a case in point. Their recurring emphasis of the benefits 
presented to their separatist struggle by democratic institutions and procedures in 
Sweden also points to a perceived instrumentalist value of democracy. 
The separatist agenda pursued by the Sweden based diaspora has also been 
framed in a rhetoric of human rights. In line with Koinova’s theory, members of the 
diaspora openly confirmed the tactical importance of adopting a rhetoric of human 
rights. The notion of human rights has deliberately been fashioned to incorporate the 
concept of “rights to self-determination”. The Acehnese diaspora has been able to 
shift their focus to the issue of human rights in times when promotion of 
independence has become too sensitive in international forums. Their deliberate acts 
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of framing allow them, however, to gradually increase their references to a vision of 
an independent Aceh, once considered feasible. Finally, Koinova’s theory of the 
adoption of liberal discourses is further supported by the fact that the Acehnese 
diaspora keeps justifying their right to independence by referring to the universal and 
all-embracing nature of international law. 
Then, what are the more general implications of having provided Koinova’s 
theory such strong empirical support? In my view, Koinova fails to transfer her 
findings to a more general discussion on the theoretical implications on diaspora 
politics. As suggested in section 2.3, Koinova’s argument could be seen as based on 
the assumption that even hardcore nationalist and religious groups – such as ethnic 
separatists – tend to adapt to selected elements of a dominant world culture to boost 
international legitimacy. Or, to put it differently, particularistic goals are framed in 
universalistic discourses. This view is obviously supported by the results of my case 
study of the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden. Moreover, I would argue that diasporas 
are in a particularly suitable position to connect such particularistic goals to the 
discourses that make up the dominant global culture. In line with Koinova’s view of 
diasporas as actors that strategically engage in homeland affairs, I argue that diaspora 
elites are able to take advantage of opportunities offered by this global structure by 
framing their local homeland cause in discourses found acceptable and honorable by 
the international community. Thus, I suggest that my findings highlight the unique 
position of diasporas in the international sphere. Diasporas operate in a space 
between the local and the global, which makes them particularly successful in 
connecting the local and the global, or particularistic and universalistic discourses. 
Accordingly, I agree with Cohen (1997: 170) when he states that: “[Diasporas] have 
always been in a better position to act as a bridge between the particular and the 
universal.” 
This means that diaspora elites are in a position to act as, what I choose to call, 
glocal actors. I draw this concept from theoretical accounts of a so called process of 
glocalization (cf. Robertson 1995; Ritzer 2010). According to the glocalization 
perspective, local political entrepreneurs are capable to maneuver, adapt, and 
innovate in creative ways within and in relation to global dynamics and forces 
(Ritzer 2010: 255). These actors are active in the intersection between global 
processes and local dynamics. Thus, the term “glocal” refers to the ways in which 
they incorporate both global and local characteristics and strategically utilize both 
universalistic and particularistic discourses – and mixtures thereof. 
In consequence, the support given to Koinova’s theory from the analysis of the 
Acehnese diaspora in Sweden implicates the glocal character of diasporas and 
diaspora elites. I would argue that politically active diaspora elites are particularly 
suited to act as glocal actors due to their superior knowledge of both local (in this 
case the Acehnese), and global contexts. They are able to work simultaneously in 
both these contexts and selectively utilizing the means that best serve their ends. 
Through acts of framing, these political actors make use of global and universal 
discourses of democracy and human rights to promote particularistic agendas in their 
homeland. 
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5.2 Recognizing Sincerity through a Perspective of 
Structuration 
Obviously, Koinova’s approach to diasporas’ adoption of liberal discourses and 
strategies is of a highly instrumentalist character. References to liberal values and 
adoption of democratic procedures are treated as mere rhetoric and tactics. However, 
some of the findings in my analysis of the Acehnese diaspora – together with 
Aspinall’s suggestion that even their national identity was affected by the 
internationalization strategy – might indicate a somewhat more sincere belief in some 
of the cited liberal discourses. Several of the Acehnese diaspora elites emphasized 
the integral role of democracy and human rights in their struggle, well before I had 
asked about its importance. 
It is obviously hard to determine the level of sincerity in these references to 
liberal values, and one should of course be careful not to over-generalize such 
indications, especially when there is a clear incentive for diasporas to present their 
commitment to these values as utterly genuine. Such a hypothesis clearly needs 
further empirical testing. However, based on the findings of my case study, and the 
unique position of diasporas between global and local discourses, I do not see any 
reason for completely ruling out the possibility that diasporas actually embrace some 
of the liberal values and principles they put across. Recognition of elements of 
sincerity is possible if the glocal position of diasporas is understood from a 
structuration perspective.
13
 Koinova correctly views diaspora elites as strategically 
reasoning actors, adept at utilizing and re-interpreting global structures and 
universalistic discourses. In line with the theory of structuration, these actors could 
however also be expected to be influenced by the very structures they shape and 
interpret for their own purposes. Thus, it would be an interesting topic for future 
research to investigate the extent to which these liberal discourses actually affect the 
heartfelt values of these diaspora elites. 
Bakhtiar Abdullah’s comment on how the Acehnese people already had an 
intrinsic understanding for the necessity of human rights – long before they were 
eventually confronted with the international terminology of the human rights 
discourse – might be a hint of mutuality and further justifies why diasporas ought to 
be seen as glocal actors. Diaspora elites are capable to connect local discourses, e.g. 
Islamic rules and principles, with global discourses, in this case the human rights 
discourse. It is an example of how the local is filtered through the global, but also a 
sign of how the global becomes filtered through the local. Such political 
entrepreneurship is made possible precisely because of the glocal character of 
diasporas. They are actors neither totally disconnected from the local context of their 
homelands, nor unfamiliar with the latest developments in global norms and 
dominant world culture. Their ability to move smoothly between these contexts, 
narratives, and discourses make them particularly potent creators of hybrid 
                                                 
13
The theory of structuration implies a mutually constitutive relationship between agents and 
structures and was developed by Giddens (1984).  
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interpretations of the local and the global, as well as bridges between the particular 
and the universal. 
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6. Conclusion 
This thesis set out to explore in what ways and to what extent the Acehnese diaspora 
in Sweden has used liberal discourses and procedures to advance a separatist agenda. 
The results of the empirical analysis show that these liberal discourses and 
procedures, indeed, have occupied a very important role in the separatist struggle of 
the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden. References to discourses of democracy, human 
rights, and universalism recur frequently both in interviews with key diaspora elites 
and in the official statements of diaspora organizations like ASNLF. At the same 
time, particularistic discourses related to ethnic separatism also permeate the rhetoric 
of the Acehnese diaspora. These two, seemingly quite different and perhaps even 
incompatible discourses, often occur side by side in this rhetoric, and sometimes 
even overlap and penetrate one another. Apposite examples include instances when 
diaspora elites maintain that roadmaps to real democracy have to include a 
referendum in which the Acehnese people could vote for independence. Other 
examples include rhetoric depicting the Acehnese struggle for independence as a 
struggle for democracy – against authoritarian Indonesian rule. Moreover, human 
rights discourses have clearly been used as a weapon in the independence struggle as 
the right to self-determination has been stressed as one of the fundamental human 
rights. Drawing upon the universality of international law and the obligation of the 
international community to act upon repeated crimes against humanity, these 
references to a human rights discourse overlap with both more abstract principles of 
human universalism, and the particularistic goal of an independent Aceh. 
In line with Koinova’s theory, I argue that these examples are typical illustrations 
of how particularistic goals are framed in liberal discourses. Thus, it constitutes a 
prime example of how the liberal creed has been utilized to gain international support 
in a local separatist conflict. In other words, I suggest that my analysis of this least 
likely case provides strong support for Koinova’s theory. Since Koinova’s theory is 
able to explain important aspects of a least likely case it also indicates a 
comprehensive appeal of the universal creed of liberalism among Western based 
conflict generated stateless diasporas. Thus, the results of this analysis point to the 
general importance of the liberal creed in international politics. It is striking that the 
orientation toward principles of democracy and human rights within the Acehnese 
diaspora in Sweden started after the liberal creed had just obtained its unchallenged 
international status in the 1990s. As was discussed already in the theory chapter of 
this thesis, now even its most unlikely advocates seem to have to at least somehow 
relate to the rules and principles of the liberal creed to be accepted as legitimate 
players in the international arena. 
As mentioned in section 5.1, I regard diasporas a particularly suitable to carry out 
such acts of framing due to their unique position as glocal actors. The uniqueness of 
the glocal character of these diasporas becomes even more apparent considering their 
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embodiment of features that have traditionally been seen as complete opposites. 
Ethnic separatists could be considered standing at the extreme point of particularistic 
political action, while transnational social movements have often been presented as 
the ultimate sign of how globalization has reduced the significance of national 
borders and spatial belonging, and generated an unprecedented sense of universalism. 
Incarnating substantial elements of both these movements, Western based diasporas 
with separatist agendas represent a quite odd and intriguing mix of features in 
international politics. 
Being a bridge between global and local contexts, and between particularistic 
issues and universalistic discourses, diasporas and their political elites can take 
advantage of useful elements and aspects of dominant liberal discourses in their 
engagement in homeland issues. Acting in the intersection between global dynamics 
– such as the universal creed of liberalism – and local dynamics – in this case the 
separatist struggle in Aceh – the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden has been able to move 
between the two contexts depending on their motives and audiences, and to 
strategically utilize elements of the liberal creed in an attempt to mobilize 
international support for an independent Aceh. Accordingly, depending on whether 
the topic in my interviews focused on the international community’s obligation to 
provide assistance to the Acehnese struggle, or touched upon the existence of support 
from Islamic organizations, the respondents selectively referred to the nature of the 
struggle as either international or local. The political entrepreneurship involved in the 
practice of framing points to the ability of diaspora elites to act strategically to 
achieve their goals. 
Having established this strategic ability to make instrumental use of liberal 
discourses and procedures, a more genuine facet of this political engagement should 
not be ruled out. As was highlighted in section 5.2, I find it likely that diaspora elites, 
to some extent, become socialized into some of the principles and values they make 
instrumental use of. To capture these dynamics, I suggest applying a structuration 
perspective in order to understand how the behavior of various actors is shaped by 
the structures they re-create and utilize in deliberate ways. Thus, even though I have 
emphasized the importance of strategic agency on the part of diasporic policy 
entrepreneurs throughout this paper, I nevertheless find it important to notice how 
global value structures and discourses might influence the minds of these actors, and 
how they set the frames for what actions diaspora elites view as suitable (or even 
consider possible in the first place). I do believe that Koinova misses or ignores this 
aspect in her highly instrumentalist approach. I would suggest that diasporas can 
utilize liberal discourses for particularistic purposes and at the same time genuinely 
believe in the adequacy and urgency of some of these universalistic principles. 
This line of reasoning would obviously need further empirical exploration to be 
asserted with any scientific credibility. This naturally spills over into a concluding 
discussion on potential avenues for future research in relation to the empirical 
findings of this thesis. 
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6.1 Future Research 
Further research on diasporas as glocal actors and strategic users of liberal discourses 
could examine the extent to – and ways in – which these discourses influence the 
outlooks of diaspora elites themselves. My suggestion that these glocal actors are 
likely to become socialized into sincerely believing in these values and principles 
requires further empirical investigation.  
Both this thesis and Koinova’s case study focus on conflict generated diasporas 
residing in Western host countries. To expand the applicability of this theory, 
diasporas based primarily in non-Western countries would constitute interesting 
candidates for future case studies. To what extent does the liberal creed penetrate 
even these countries? Could we think of any other doctrine that might challenge the 
dominant position of the liberal creed in the non-Western parts of the world? What 
would it look like? And what would the consequences be for how diaspora elites 
promote their causes and mobilize host country support? These issues doubtlessly 
deserve to be scrutinized in future academic research. 
This thesis has argued for the uniqueness of the truly glocal character of Western 
based diasporas engaged in sovereignty issues in their homelands. But exactly how 
unique are these diasporas as glocal actors? What other types of political movements 
and actors could be considered truly glocal? Do some actors perhaps incorporate 
selected glocal characteristics? Studying other types of diasporas, e.g. diasporas that 
are not involved in sovereignty issues in their homelands, or other transnational 
actors and movements, might help answering these questions. 
In a wider perspective, the effect of Koinova’s argument on how the international 
community ought to view the role of diasporas in contexts of conflict could be 
further analyzed. Does diaspora adoption of liberal values and procedures make them 
more likely to become peace-makers rather than peace-wreckers? And if that turns 
out to be the case, what are the policy implications for whether and how diasporas 
should be included in initiatives for peacemaking and peace building? 
Related to these queries, it would also be interesting to examine whether 
diasporas utilizing liberal discourses, influence their compatriots at home. Are these 
internationalization strategies met by skepticism among local actors? Or do they 
identify with them and support the campaigns initiated by the diaspora? And do local 
actors in any way become inspired by the ways in which diasporas frame local 
demands in liberal discourses? 
Finally, it might be worthwhile to more thoroughly study the reactions and 
response among host countries toward diasporas that embrace liberal values and 
procedures. Do these strategies actually manage to generate any international support? 
And what issues and values are more likely to be internationally lauded and met with 
support and recognition from governments, inter-governmental organizations, and 
NGOs? Answering these questions might shed more light on the rationale behind 
diasporic strategies and on the attraction of the liberal creed. 
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Appendix: Interview Guide 
Introduce the topic of my thesis and define key concepts. Discuss ethical issues and 
the rights of the respondent. Explain the structure of the interview. 
 
Personal Questions 
 
1. Could you describe your relationship to Aceh? 
- Are you born in Aceh? 
- When did you come to Sweden? 
- Do you have any friends or family in Aceh? 
 
2. Could you describe how you have been engaged in the political situation in Aceh? 
- Member of any diaspora organization? 
- How long have you been active? 
 
3. Why have you engaged yourself in the political situation in Aceh? 
- What are the main goals of your involvement? 
 
 
Thematic Questions 
 
Questions related to the properties of the Acehnese diaspora: 
 
4. Approximately how many Acehnese are living in exile? 
- In Sweden? 
 
5. Where is the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden mainly located? 
- Concentrated to any cities/regions? 
 
6. What is the main reason for the emigration from Aceh? 
 
7. Which diaspora organizations do you know of? 
 
 
Questions related to the political activities of the Acehnese diaspora: 
 
8. What potential role do you think the Acehnese diaspora can play in the political 
development in Aceh? 
 
9. How has the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden been engaged in the situation in Aceh? 
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- Could you give any examples of its political activities? 
 
10. What kind of influence does the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden have on the 
political developments in Aceh? 
- Has this influence increased or decreased over time? 
 
11. What do you hope that the political activities of the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden 
will result in? 
- Has this goal changed over time? 
 
12. Is there any internal disagreement within the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden when 
it comes to the means and ends for its political engagement in Aceh? 
 
13. Do you see any advantages related to being part of the diaspora rather than being 
inside Aceh when you try to influence the political developments there? 
 
14. Has the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden tried to influence politicians or 
organizations in Sweden? 
- Or abroad? 
- Which ones? 
- How? 
- What kind of response have you received? 
- How can you get politicians or the public to listen to your campaigns and 
become engaged in the situation in Aceh? 
o Do they become more engaged if you emphasize certain issues? 
- Could you give an example of an instance when the Acehnese diaspora in 
Sweden has tried to influence a politician or an organization? Please tell 
me how you proceeded. 
 
 
Questions related to issues of democracy and human rights: 
 
15. How important are issues of democracy and human rights in your struggle? 
- Has it become more or less important over time? 
 
16. How does the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden work for democracy and human 
rights? 
- Has this work changed over time? 
 
17. Do you think the issue of democracy and human rights has been more or less 
important in the diaspora compared to local actors in Aceh? 
 
18. Has the issue of human rights been a means toward an end or a goal in itself in 
your struggle? 
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19. What would you say is most important in your struggle; issues of democracy and 
human rights or independence for Aceh? 
- Do you think most members of the diaspora share this view? 
o What about local actors in Aceh? 
 
 
Concluding Questions 
 
- Do you know of any other members of the Acehnese diaspora in Sweden who 
have been politically active and could consider being interviewed for my thesis? 
 
- Can I contact you again in the future if I come up with any additional questions? 
 
